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Article 5

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Nebraska Law Review is pleased to continue in this issue
a section devoted exclusively to recent decisions of the Nebraska
Supreme Court. This section will contain a critical discussion of
recent decisions which the Nebraska Law Review believes are
either cases of first impression in our court or rulings which substantially alter previous case law in Nebraska. The purpose of the
Nebraska section is (1) to provide attorneys in Nebraska and elsewhere with a comprehensive study of the holdings of selected cases
and an analysis of how these decisions relate to previous Nebraska
decisions, and (2) to provide a forum in which members of the
Nebraska Law Review can critically analyze the rationale of the
cases in light of decisions in other jurisdictions.
The decisions composing the section were taken from decisions
handed down during the last half of the 1968-69 term. This will
update 48 Nebraska Law Review 985 (1969), which analyzed the
first half of the term.
The subject areas and decisions discussed in this Nebraska Supreme Court Review are as follows:
I. Adoption-Inheritance
Wulf v. Ibsen, 184 Neb. 314, 167 N.W.2d 181 (1969).
II. Contracts
Heine v. Fleischer, 184 Neb. 379, 167 N.W.2d 572 (1969).
III. Criminal Law
A. Miranda-Related Decisions
1. State v. Dubany, 184 Neb. 337, 167 N.W.2d 556 (1969).
2. State v. Caha, 184 Neb. 70, 165 N.W.2d 362 (1969).
B. Right To Conduct Own Defense and Pretrial Identification
State v. Beasley, 183 Neb. 681, 163 N.W.2d 783 (1969).
C. Evidence
1. State v. Allen, 183 Neb. 831, 164 N.W.2d 662 (1969).
2. State v. Caha, 184 Neb. 70, 165 N.W.2d 362 (1969).
D. Procedure
State v. Brockman, 184 Neb. 435, 168 N.W.2d 367 (1969).
E. Criminal Flight
State v. Lincoln, 183 Neb. 770, 164 N.W.2d 470 (1969).
IV. Evidence
Anderson v. State Department of Roads, 184 Neb. 467, 168
N.W.2d 522 (1969).
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V.

Insurance-Automobile
Arndt v. Davis, 183 Neb. 726, 163 N.W.2d 886 (1969).
VI. Natural Resources
A. Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 184 Neb. 384, 168
N.W.2d 510 (1969).
B. Brummund v. Vogel, 184 Neb. 415, 168 N.W.2d 24 (1969).
VII. Parol Evidence
Property Sales, Inc. v. Irvington Ice Cream and Frozen Arts,
Inc., 184 Neb. 17, 165 N.W.2d 78 (1969).
VIII. Real Property
A. Horst v. Housing Authority, 184 Neb. 215, 166 N.W.2d
119 (1969).
B. Miles Homes, Inc. v. Muhs, 184 Neb. 617, 169 N.W.2d 691
(1969).
IX. Torts-Negligence
Newkirk v. Kovanda, 184 Neb. 127, 165 N.W.2d 576 (1969).
X. Workmens Compensation
A. Injury From Employment Exertion or Strain
1. Brokaw v. Robinson, 183 Neb. 760, 164 N.W.2d 461
(1969).
2. Beck v. State, 184 Neb. 477, 168 N.W.2d 532 (1969).
B. The Increased-Risk Test and "Contact-with-the-Premises" Exception in "Injury by the Elements" Cases
Ingram v. Bradley, 183 Neb. 692, 163 N.W.2d 875 (1969).
C. Expert Medical Testimony
Yost v. City of Lincoln, 184 Neb. 263, 166 N.W.2d 595
(1969).
The Nebraska section does not include those cases which are or
may become the subject of individual case notes. Thus this section
does not represent a discussion of all of the important Nebraska
decisions. The Review would welcome any suggestions from Nebraska attorneys or others interested in Nebraska law regarding
both the method by which cases may be selected for future issues
and the general form and content of this section.
John A. Rasmussen, Jr.
NebraskaEditor
I. ADOPTION-INHERITANCE
Wulf v. Ibsen' was a case of first impression in Nebraska, in
which the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that an adopted
child could inherit from his natural parents.
1 184 Neb. 314, 167 N.W.2d 181 (1969).
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Fred Wulf died intestate survived by four children. He had been
married twice and had two children by each marriage. The plaintiff, Mrs. Anna Marie Ibsen, was born during his first marriage and,
during her mother's last illness, was placed under the care of Fred
Wulf's sister, Mrs. Reeh. Later the plaintiff was adopted by Mrs.
Reeh and her husband, but continued to keep in close contact with
her father during his lifetime. The plaintiff shared in her adoptive
father's estate when he died testate, and inherited the remainder
of her adoptive parent's estate when her adoptive mother died
intestate under Nebraska law.2 This action involved plaintiff's claim
for her share of her natural father's intestate estate as a natural
child.3
In reaching its decision that Mrs. Ibsen could inherit from her
natural father, the court reasoned that adoption was a creature of
statute and, as such, the "rights accruing or sacrificed by reason
of adoption are to be determined by reference to the statutes of
the state having jurisdiction."4 After examining the Nebraska statutes governing adoption, the court concluded that although a
natural parent could not inherit from his own child once adopted
by other parents, 5 "the failure to restrict the right of the child to
inherit from its natural parents cannot be deemed an oversight
but rather an act evidencing the legislative intent to preserve this
right in the child."8 This legislative intent was even more clearly
expressed by the statute providing that where a child was placed
under the care of the Department of Public Welfare or a licensed
7
child placement agency, his right to inherit would not be impaired.
Other jurisdictions presented with the question in Wuif and with
statutes similar to those of Nebraska have also preserved the right
of the adopted child to inherit from his natural parents.8 The Utah
Supreme Court approached the question of, whether an adopted
child could inherit from his natural parents as one of statutory construction.9 The Utah court construed the statutes as being enacted
for the benefit of the adopted child and held that simply by virtue
of being born to his natural parents, a child's status was established
under Utah's succession statutes and the adopted child became
entitled to inherit from its natural parents. 10
2 NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-110 (Reissue 1968).
3 NEB. RPv. SmT. § 30-102 (Reissue 1964).
4 Wulf v. Ibsen, 184 Neb. 314, 315, 167 N.W.2d 181, 182 (1969).
5 In re Estate of Enyart, 116 Neb. 450, 218 N.W. 89 (1928); NEB.

6
7

8

9
10

§ 43-111 (Reissue 1968).
Wulf v. Ibsen, 184 Neb. 314, 317, 167 N.W.2d 181, 183 (1969).
NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-106.01 (Reissue 1968).
E.g., In re Ballantine's Estate, 81 N.W.2d 259 (N.D. 1957).
In re Benner's Estate, 109 Utah 172, 166 P.2d 257 (1946).
Id.
STAT.

REV.
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The Supreme Court of Washington also approached the problem
in terms of statutory construction in In re Roderick's Estate." The
Washington court reasoned that:
Our adoption statute grants to the adopted child the right to
inherit from its adoptive parent, but does not divest that child of
the right of inheritance from its natural parents. The statute is
in derogation of the common law. It cannot be assumed, presumed
or inferred that the appellant cannot inherit from her
father, in
the absence of a legislative declaration to that effect. 12
In jurisdictions which, pursuant to their statutes, grant an
adopted child the right to inherit from his adoptive parent, the
question of whether an adopted child is entitled to inherit from his
natural parent necessarily raises the question whether a state
allows a dual inheritance. The Nebraska Supreme Court, in In re
Estate of Enyart 3 held that: "[O]ur statute of adoption creates the
legal relation of parent and child and gives to the adoptive parent
and the adopted child all of the rights that pertain to that relation
by virtue of the statute of descent."' 4 It is apparent from the court's
decision in In re Estate of Enyart that, in Nebraska, an adopted
child can inherit from his adoptive parents. The Wulf decision
allows an adopted child to inherit from his natural parents, and
consequently, implies that a dual inheritance is acceptable in Nebraska, even though the court never discussed dual inheritance. 15
Courts in at least two other jurisdictions have, however, found
dual inheritance to be an unattractive policy. 16 The Missouri Supreme Court was confronted with a situation similar to the one
before the court in Wulf.' 7 In discussing the application of a statute whose language was considerably stronger than Nebraska
statutes regarding adoption,' the court commented on dual inheri11 158 Wash. 377, 291 P. 325 (1930). The court held that under the statute

of descent an adopted daughter was entitled to share in the estate of
her natural father.

Id. at 381, 291 P. at 326.
1.3116 Neb. 450, 218 N.W. 89 (1928).
14 Id. at 455, 218 N.W. at 91. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-110 (Reissue 1968).
15 In their brief the appellants dealt with the issue of dual inheritance
12

and, in fact, devoted a large part of their argument to that question.
Brief for Appellants at 10-17, Wulf v. Ibsen, 184 Neb. 314, 167 N.W.2d
16

181 (1969).
Wailes v. Curators of Central College, 363 Mo. 932, 254 S.W.2d 645
(1953); Young v. Bridges, 86 N.H. 135, 165 A. 272 (1933).

17 Wailes v. Curators of Central College, 363 Mo. 932, 254 S.W.2d 645
(1953).
18

"When a child is adopted in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter, all legal relationships and all rights and duties between such
child and his natural parents ... shall cease and determine. .. " Mo.
REv. STAT. § 453.090 (1949) (emphasis added).
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tance. The Missouri Supreme Court cited the opinion of a dissenting
justice in an earlier Utah case, In re Benner's Estate,19 where Justice
Turner argued:
Adoptions are granted primarily for the best interests of the
child adopted. Generally the change by adoption is one of gain. The
new status is a better one than the former. To grant dual inheritance, the child adopted would be given the inheritance of a natural
child and allowed an additional one. The law intended to give
the child adopted the same rights and advantages of a natural
child as far as possible. It was never intended to give the child of
adoption more.2 0

The Missouri court felt that this dissent expressed the law in Missouri as evidenced by Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Walsh.2 1 In
Walsh the court stated:
It is no part of the public policy of the state that adoption should
operate as an instrumentality for dual inheritance, with resulting
animosity and litigation among those whom a testator provided in
his will should share with equality and per stirpes. And the denial
of dual inheritance under these circumstances is not opposed22to the
public policy of promoting the welfare of adopted children.
The failure of the Nebraska Supreme Court to discuss the issue
of dual inheritance in Wulf implied an approval of the doctrine. It
is submitted that the position of the Supreme Court of Nebraska
is in agreement with In re Roderick's Estate,23 cited favorably in
the Wulf opinion. 24 In Roderick's Estate, the Supreme Court of
Washington held that in the absence of a statute preventing dual
inheritance, an adopted child could inherit from both adoptive and
25
natural parents.
The Wulf decision permits an adopted child to inherit from his
natural parents which, in conjunction with an adopted child's statutory right to inherit from his adoptive parents, confers upon the
adopted child the right to a dual inheritance.
I. CONTRACTS
2

In Heine v. Fleischer 6 plaintiff sought to recover damages for an
alleged failure of the defendants to deliver possession of property
in accordance with the parties' oral agreement. Defendants had
19 109 Utah 172, 166 P.2d 257 (1946).
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id. at 179, 166 P.2d at 260.
360 Mo. 610, 229 S.W.2d 675 (1950).
Id. at 619-20, 229 S.W.2d at 681.
158
184
158
184

Wash. 377, 291 P. 325 (1930).
Neb. at 318, 167 N.W.2d at 183.
Wash. at 383-84, 291 P.2d at 327.
Neb. 379, 167 N.W.2d 572 (1969).
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granted plaintiff an option to purchase land owned by them. The
option was exercised and a deed was delivered. Plaintiff alleged
the parties had stipulated in the oral agreement that March 30, 1962,
was to be the date for delivery of possession. The written memorandum contained no reference to the date of delivery. Defendant's
demurrer to plaintiff's petition was sustained by the trial court on
the grounds that any oral agreement between the parties as to
delivery date of the property was void under the Statute of
Frauds.2 7 The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
decision. In so doing the court held that under the circumstances
the time for performance had to be included in the memorandum.
Time for performance is not ordinarily an essential term of the
contract because the law implies that it shall take place within a
reasonable time. But if the time for performance is specified,
it
must be included in the memorandum to be enforceable. 28
The supreme court applied the reasoning of an earlier case, Ord
v. Benson,29 involving sales of goods, to the situation in Heine. In
Ord the court upheld the memorandum as being sufficient because
the date of delivery was not agreed upon in the oral contract.
The memorandum must contain a statement of the essential terms
of the oral contract. If the time of delivery of the goods and the
time of their payment is an integral part of the oral contract, they
must be set out in the written memorandum. But if, as here,
they are not agreed upon in the oral contract, the law implies
that the delivery was to be made in a reasonable time and that
payment would be made upon delivery. 30
The Nebraska Statute of Frauds provides that the memorandum
must be in writing.
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year,
or for the sale of any lands, shall be void unless the contract or
some note or memorandum thereof be in writing and signed by the
party by whom the lease or sale is to be made.3 '
The Nebraska Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that
the memorandum must contain the "essential terms" of the oral
contract. 32 If the "essential terms" are not included then the memorandum is insufficient under the Statute of Frauds.
27 NEB. REV. STAT.
28
29
30

31
32

§ 36-105 (Reissue 1968).

184 Neb. at 380, 167 N.W.2d at 573-74.
163 Neb. 367, 79 N.W.2d 713 (1956).
Id. at 370, 79 N.W.2d at 715.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 36-105 (Reissue 1968).
"The memorandum required by the statute of frauds must contain the
essential terms of the contract." Heine v. Fleischer, 184 Neb. 379, 380,
167 N.W.2d 572, 573 (1969). See also Ord v. Benson, 163 Neb. 367, 79
N.W.2d 713 (1956); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 207 (1932).
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The memorandum is not subject to the parol evidence rule. It
may be shown by parol evidence . . .that the memorandum was
incomplete and that the oral agreement contained terms not set
forth in the memorandum.... [In such a case,] it would have to
be held that the memorandum was insufficient under the statute of
frauds and that the agreement between the parties was unenforceable for that reason... 33

The difficulty lies in defining what are the "essential terms. 3 4
"There is... considerable diversity of opinion in the jurisdictions as

to what constitutes 'essential terms,' and this is clearly reflected in
the cases. Perhaps nowhere is this as well illustrated... as in contracts for the sale of land. 3' 5 The phrase is very flexible and can
usually be best answered by looking at the particular case.
For purposes of applying the statute of frauds, as for other
purposes, what terms are so "essential" that they cannot be
supplied by parol evidence is a question of degree to be answered
in the light of circumstances of the particular case. A rule stated
in such words as these does not go far in helping a court to decide
a case but it should serve to warn the court that the application of
the statute is not a mere matter of textual interpretation... 36

Although the question has not arisen in many jurisdictions, the
majority of courts which have been confronted with the issue have
held that the time of delivery is an "essential term" of the oral
37
contract.

33 Nathan v. Spector, 281 App. Div. 451, 453, 120 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361 (1953).
34 The Nebraska Supreme Court has determined in several cases what
some of the "essential terms" to be included in the memorandum
are: (1) Ord v. Benson, 163 Neb. 367, 79 N.W.2d 713 (1956) (time of
delivery of goods and time of payment if agreed upon in the oral
contract); (2) Barkhurst v. Nevins, 106 Neb. 33, 182 N.W. 563 (1921)
(signature of vendor); (3) Frahm v. Metcalf, 75 Neb. 241, 106 N.W. 227
(1905) (names or descriptions of parties to the agreement); (4) McWilliams v. Lawless, 15 Neb. 131, 17 N.W. 349 (1883) (description of
land sold).
35 4 S.WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 575 (3d ed. 1961).
36 2 A. CoRBIN, CoPnBIN ox CONTRACTS § 499 (1950).
37 Santoro v. Mack, 108 Conn. 683, 145 A. 273 (1929); Block v. Sherman, 109 Ind. App. 330, 34 N.E.2d 951 (1941); Carpenter v. Murphy,
40 S.D. 280, 167 N.W. 175 (1918); Beckman v. Brickley, 144 Wash.
558, 258 P. 488 (1927). See also RESTATEMENT OP CONTRACTS § 207(c)
(1932). 2 A. CORBN, CoRan7 ON CONTRACTS § 499 (1950) (emphasis
added): "If a memorandum for the sale of land describes the land,
the price, and the parties, it satisfies the statute [of frauds] if the
parties made an oral agreement containing only those terms, intending
to be bound thereby, saying nothing whatever as to ...the time and
place of payment and delivery...
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If the parol agreement fixed no time for delivery, the memorandum
evidencing the contract is sufficient under the statute, since it
contains all the terms which have been agreed on. In such a case
the law supplies the missing term and requires delivery within a
reasonable time. If, on the other hand,38the time was fixed by the
parties the memorandum is insufficient.

In holding that the date of delivery, if stipulated in the oral
contract, was an "essential term," the Heine court overruled a portion of the earlier case of Ruzicka v. Hotovy. 9 In Ruzicka the supreme court had held that the time for consummation of the contract could be established by parol evidence and therefore did not
have to be included in the memorandum.
[The memorandum] is .

.

. lacking in no particulars, unless it be

in respect that it does not specify when the remainder of the consideration is to be paid, nor when the transfer is to be made, nor
whether the deferred payments are to be secured. 40
These matters
may be proved by parol evidence under our statute.
It is submitted that by overuling Ruzicka the supreme court
has actually applied the intent of the parties to the transaction. By
setting the specific time for performance the parties have established that they consider it to be an essential term of the oral contract. Under the Statute of Frauds, it should be included in the
written memorandum and not subject to repudiation by one of
the parties. The parties have shown that the time for performance
is no longer open to negotiation, and they intend to be bound by
that date. It must, therefore, be included in the memorandum.
III. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Miranda-RELATED DEcIsIONS
Two cases recently decided by the Nebraska Supreme Court,
State v. Dubany4' and State v. Caha,42 relate to the Nebraska interpretation of the "in custody" and "substantial denial of freedom"
statements found in Miranda v. Arizona.43 The combined result of
the Nebraska cases arguably bends the spirit of Miranda and may
undermine its effectiveness in this state.
State v. Dubany44 is concerned with the Nebraska court's interpretation of the "on-the-scene investigation" test as opposed to in38 Berman Stores Co., Inc. v. Hirsh, 240 N.Y. 209, 214, 148 N.E. 212, 213
39

40
41
42
43
44

(1925).
72 Neb. 589, 101 N.W. 328 (1904).

Id. at 593, 101 N.W. at 329.
184 Neb. 337, 167 N.W.2d 556 (1969).
184 Neb. 70, 165 N.W.2d 362 (1969).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
184 Neb. 337, 167 N.W.2d 556 (1969).
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custody interrogation mentioned in Miranda v. Arizona,4 5 and the
admissibility of any evidence derived therefrom. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that questioning a defendant before arrest was
permissible without giving the Miranda warning" and any statements made at that time could be used as evidence against him.
The opportunity to question the defendant in Dubany arose
when Officer Zurcher approached the defendant's vehicle which
was stuck in a ditch beside the road. The officer requested the defendant, who was seated in the drivers seat of his own vehicle, to
hand over his drivers license. After checking it, the officer asked the
defendant if he had been drinking. Defendant answered, "Yes. 4 7
Defendant was taken to the patrol car and driven to Valentine for
a blood test. The result: .27 percent alcohol by weight in the blood.
The evidence here, without defendant's admission that he had
been drinking, is sufficient to support the conviction. The possible
importance of this decision, however, rests in the failure of the
officer to give the Miranda warnings, before asking any questions
relating to the probable violation. The decision can be considered
consistent with a narrow construction of the Miranda decision.
There was no coercion evidenced by the given testimony. Dubany
was not under arrest, and was alone, inside his own vehicle at the
time of the question. But there are several questions raised by the
Dubany decision which may be cause for concern.
Dubany could be read to have established the precedent in this
state that an investigating officer could delay arrest until after
questioning. Thus, as in this particular case, an officer who has
good reason to believe that a crime has been committed and knows
who the defendant will be, could have the sanction of the Nebraska
Supreme Court in evading the constitutional mandate of Miranda
by conducting a complete interrogation, under the guise of an "onthe-scene investigation," before announcing that the defendant is
now under arrest and now protected by the Constitution. It is submitted that under Miranda the defendant is entitled to the warnings protection before questioning when the officer reasonably
feels he has committed the alleged crime under investigation and
any statements made by the defendant before the Mirandawarnings
should not be allowed into evidence.
45 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
46

The Miranda warnings are: (a) the suspect has a right to remain
silent; (b) any statement can and will be used against him; (c) he has
the right to an attorney (appointed or retained). Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966).

47

184 Neb. 337, 338, 167 N.W.2d 556, 557 (1969).
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In this same light, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated in Dubany
that: "In on-the-scene investigations the police may interview any
person not in custody and not subject to coercion for the purpose
of determining whether a crime has been committed and who com''48
mitted it.
The text in Miranda from which the court derived this
conclusion reads as follows:
When an individual is in custody on probable cause, the police may,
of course, seek out evidence in the field to be used at trial against
him. Such investigation may include inquiry of persons not under
restraint. General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens
in the factfinding process is not affected by our holding.49
Clearly, the intention of the United States Supreme Court was
to limit the investigation to those who would not reasonably be considered defendants. Miranda allows interrogation of potential defendants only after they have been made aware of their constitutional rights and have knowingly and voluntarily waived those
rights, regardless of whether the officer has gone through the formality of arrest.
Finally, Dubany may have established that questioning a defendant in his own vehicle is questioning before custody which
involves a situation where the defendant has not been substantially
denied his freedom of action.50 This may present difficult questions
which should not be settled by an unbending general rule. A better
method would be to consider each case on its particular facts and
the determinative test should be whether the individual would be
allowed to leave the officer without recourse. Thus any actual or
apparent control of the accused by the officer could be ascertained
in order to properly determine whether the defendant was entitled
to the warnings. If there is an arrest, naturally the warnings must
be given. More importantly, however, the warnings must be given
when the person is substantially denied his freedom of action. If
the officer does control the person's movements then that individual
should be placed under arrest and given notice of his constitutional
rights.
State v. Caha5l also dealt with the problem of those particular situations where the Miranda warnings 52 are required to be given in
Nebraska. Specifically, it dealt with whether questioning in a police
48
49

184 Neb. 337, 342, 167 N.W.2d 556, 559 (1969) (emphasis added).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966) (emphasis added).

50 Id.

51 184 Neb. 70, 165 N.W.2d 362 (1969).
52

See note 46 supra.
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cruiser, resulting in an admission of guilt, should be considered part
of the process of interrogation aimed at eliciting incriminating
statements from the defendant.53
The interview in question arose from the alleged crime of rape
which occurred on the day before the defendant was interrogated.
The prosecutrix was unable to identify her attacker, but she did give
the investigators sufficient factual evidence regarding her attacker,
and a description of his vehicle, to lead the police to Caha. The
officer "talked with the defendant about his car, his family, and
matters of general interest. He then gave the Miranda warnings
which he recited on the witness stand, in which he made no mention
of the defendant's right to remain silent." 54 Caha then told the
officer that he had picked up the prosecutrix and engaged in sexual
relations with her.
The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that "the evidence was
acquired during the investigative process and does not relate to the
evils that Escobedo and Miranda were intended to correct." 55 In
reaching this result, the court gave no consideration to the question
of whether the omission of the warning of defendant's right to remain silent would constitute reversible error.5 6
Therefore, the only point to be considered is whether the Nebraska Supreme Court was correct in deciding that the questioning
was "purely investigative." The court based its decision on the
conclusions that "the evidence was acquired during the investigative process... [and] the defendant, so far as the evidence shows,
was not in custody nor otherwise deprived of his freedom until
after his admissions were made to the officer. 57 It is submitted that
the court has perhaps failed to properly consider the foundations
of Escobedo and Miranda in arriving at this conclusion.
Escobedo holds:
[W]hen the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when

its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession
-our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his
lawyer.58
By its holding in Caha the Nebraska Supreme Court has ruled

that the process is not accusatory when facts link the defend184 Neb. 70, 165 N.W.2d 362 (1969).
54 184 Neb. 70, 72, 165 N.W.2d 362, 363 (1969).
55 Id. at 74, 165 N.W.2d at 364.
56 Id. at 72, 165 N.W.2d at 363.
57 Id. at 74-75, 165 N.W.2d at 364.
58 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).
65
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ant to the alleged crime, the defendant is given the majority of the
Miranda warnings, 59 and the officer demands: "Tell me about the
girl you had in your car last night."60 It would appear in light of
these facts that the fine line separating the investigatory from the
accusatory stage had been crossed.
Miranda holds: "At the outset, if a person in custody is to be
subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and
unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent."61
The court's conclusion that Caha was "not in custody" at the
time of his interrogation seems to be in direct conflict with testimony adduced at the trial. The relevant portion of Officer Gallagher's testimony is as follows:
Q: When did you have him under arrest?
A: Well, when I first met him.
The Court: You mean under arrest or in custody?
Q: In custody?
A: When I first met him in the work part of the Taylor Florist
there I said I wanted to talk to him, I was a police officer and I
showed him my badge and I told him 'come outside, I want to talk
to you' and he came out and that's when I first started to talk to
him.
Q: You say that's when you had him in custody at that time?
A: Yes. 62
When coupled with the knowledge of the defendant's "confinement" in the police cruiser during the "interrogation," the court's
statement that the defendant was "not in custody nor otherwise
deprived of his freedom" seems clearly erroneous.
Further evidence of the court's misapplication of Miranda and
Escobedo is the officer's decision to read the Miranda warnings and
the confinement in the police cruiser. There are cases and other
authorities which conclude that interrogation while defendant is
in a police cruiser is further evidence of custodial interrogation as
opposed to a general investigation. 63 These authorities, and the fact
that Officer Gallagher's questions could most reasonably be considered accusatory rather than investigatory, indicate a most narrow reading of Miranda by the Nebraska court.
59
60
61
62
63

In Caha the officer omitted the right of the suspect to remain silent.
184 Neb. 70, 74, 165 N.W.2d 362, 364 (1969).
384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966).
Brief for Appellant at 12.
Duchett v. State, 3 Md. App. 563, 240 A.2d 332 (1968); People v. Allen,
50 Misc. 2d 897, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1966); "Comments on Miranda v.
Arizona," Criminal Law Bulletin 9 (July-August 1966, Vol. 2, No. 6);
19 Am. JuR. Proof of Facts § 17 at 28-31 (1967).
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The court seems to have ignored the basic principles behind the
Miranda decision, and the constitutional protections established
therein. The odious techniques used by some law enforcement personnel, specifically condemned by the United States Supreme Court
in Miranda v. Arizona, have, at least for the moment, not been
clearly laid to rest in Nebraska.

B. RIGHT TO CONDUCT OwN DEFENSE AND PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION
State v. Beasley6" dealt with the right of a defendant to conduct
his own defense and the question of whether pretrial identification
of the defendant from photographs is prejudicial error.
The identification and trial resulted from a robbery at King
Loan Company on October 11, 1967. The cashier, alone in the office,
had just completed counting the cash on hand. The defendant, after
waiting several minutes for the manager, held a gun on the cashier
and took the cash. On leaving the office the defendant passed the
manager and assistant manager who were returning to the office.
Following the defendant's arrest, the cashier was taken to the
police station where she identified the defendant's photograph from
among several before her. At the trial defendant was positively
identified by the cashier, the assistant manager and the manager.
The defendant was represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing but at trial he "refused assistance of counsel and insisted that
he be allowed to represent himself."6 5
The Nebraska Supreme Court based its decision on the question
of whether a defendant may conduct his own defense on a South
Dakota case, State v. Thomlinson,66 also involving robbery. In
Thomlinson the South Dakota Supreme Court held that a defendant electing to defend himself in person "with full knowledge and
understanding of the danger and possible pit falls of representing
himself.. . should be allowed to do So.''67 The Nebraska Supreme
Court framed the same meaning in these words: "[I]n the absence
of unusual circumstances a defendant in a criminal case who is sui
juris and mentally competent has the right to conduct his defense
in person without assistance of counsel." 68 This right is further
embodied in both the constitution and statutes of Nebraska. 69
The question of the mental competency is not handled thoroughly by the decision in Beasley, especially with regard to the
64 183 Neb. 681, 163 N.W.2d 783 (1969).
65 Id. at 683, 163 N.W.2d at 785.
66 78 S.D. 235, 100 N.W.2d 121 (1960).
67 Id. at 238, 100 N.W.2d at 123.
68 State v. Beasley, 183 Neb. 681, 683, 163 N.W.2d 783, 785 (1969).
69 NEB. CoNsT. art. I, § 11; NEB.REv. STAT. § 7-110 (Reissue 1962).
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formulation of any viable test of mental competency for future
application. In Beasley the only evidence pertaining to mental
incompetence was the admission by the defendant at sentencing
that he had voluntarily gone to the Ohio State Hospital as a "TV
man" but had received no treatment. The Nebraska Supreme Court
apparently saw nothing in the trial record to indicate that Beasley
was not mentally competent, nor did they attempt either to define
the term or elucidate factors which would indicate mental incompetence. Consequently, we are left without a test and without guidelines in the determination of mental competence.
The most expressive case on the issue of mental competence to
conduct your own trial is Dietz v. State30 In Dietz, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court looked at (1) the overwhelming case against the
defendant; (2) the defendant's decision not to use a lawyer; (3) the
defendant's knowledge of trial procedure; (4) the defendant's apparent understanding and effective use of the rules of evidence;
and (5) the "fluency and force" of his address to the jury, in finding
that there was nothing substantial to support a claim of mental
incompetence. It is submitted that the Nebraska Supreme Court
should have explicated some or all of these points. We are left, however, to speculate as to what was actually considered in' 7 finding
that
1
"[t]here is no other evidence of mental incompetence."
The other issue considered by the Nebraska Supreme Court was
the question of photographic identification of the defendant. The
Nebraska Supreme Court settled the matter in an abrupt manner
by adopting the test used by the United States Supreme Court in
Simmons v. United States.7 2 The holding in Simmons indicated that
each case would have to be considered on its own facts and then
examined for "a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. '73 In Beasley there seems to be no question that the
cashier had more than ample opportunity to observe the defendant
and her identification from photographs "did not result in any pre'74
judice to the defendant.

C. EVDENCE
In State v. Allen 75 defendant was convicted in county court of
robbery. The case on appeal dealt solely with the admissibility of
evidence when the chain of evidence tracing the possession of
objects could at some time have been broken.
70

149 Wis. 462, 136 N.W. 166 (1912).

71 State v. Beasley, 183 Neb. 681, 683, 163 N.W.2d 783, 785 (1969).
72

390 U.S. 377 (1968).

73 Id. at 384.
74 183 Neb. 681, 685, 163 N.W.2d 783, 786 (1969).
75 183 Neb. 831, 164 N.W.2d 662 (1969).
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Defendant Allen was approached following a robbery of a cigarette lighter, part of a roll of mints, and $4.43 in cash. The arresting
officers observed the defendant throwing a lighter into the weeds
and on searching the defendant, recovered the remaining stolen
items. All recovered items were identified by the victim, who again
identified these objects at trial. Between the seizure of the stolen
items and their introduction at trial, the lighter and mints were
stored in a property envelope in the evidence vault at the Omaha
Police Department.
The Nebraska Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the
lower court, stated the admissibility test as follows:
[A]n exhibit is admissible, so far as identity is concerned, when
it has been identified as being the same object about which testimony was given. It must also be shown to the satisfaction of the
trial court that no substantial76change has taken place in the exhibit
so as to render it misleading.
Appellant's primary contention on appeal was that the identity
of objects admitted into evidence must be traced through every
hand that held them and failure to do so renders the objects inadmissable. This contention is a fairly accurate assessment of the law
when applied to chemical testing77 and the correlation between the
object and the test result. It would be essential for the credibility
of a chemical test that the test result could be conclusively linked
to the actual object being introduced into evidence. But that is not
the problem in this case. Allen deals only with identification of
material, visible or identifiable objects and the test applied to admissibility of scientific evidence is not necessary for such evidence.
The recent Nebraska case of State v. Gau78 held that property
which is the object of a robbery is always admissible into evidence
when properly identified. In Allen the court wisely refines this test
by requiring both proper identification and no misleading or substantial change in the object. The question of whether the substantial change renders the object misleading
and thus inadmissible
79
is left to the discretion of the trial judge.
In adopting this test the Nebraska Supreme Court has followed
the weight of authority on this question.80 The wisdom of the majority is based on its practicality. In any given situation the proof
Id. at 833, 164 N.W.2d at 664.
E.g., Joyner v. Utterback, 196 Iowa 1040, 195 N.W. 594 (1923).
182 Neb. 114, 153 N.W.2d 298 (1967).
79 State v. Allen, 183 Neb. 831, 164 N.W.2d 662 (1969).
so Brewer v. United States, 353 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1965); West v. United
States, 359 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 867 (1966);
United States v. S. B. Penick & Co., 136 F.2d 413 (2d Cir. 1943).
76

77
78
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of the complete chain of evidence could take days. It would create
an unreasonable burden on the party introducing the evidence and
would serve no valuable purpose. Without clear abuse of discretion
by the police and/or prosecuting attorneys, evidence should be admitted when the tests established by Allen are fulfilled.
State v. Hunters ' pertains to the admissibility into evidence of
burglary tools found on or near a building from which the defendant was seen fleeing. This is a case of first impression in Nebraska
s2
which extends the general theme of former Nebraska precedent
and follows a line of recent Illinois decisions.83
The burglary tools in question were found by a police officer
after being called to the scene by the night watchman at Weslake
Bar who heard someone trying to chop into the roof of the bar.
Upon arriving at the scene, the officers observed one person fleeing
from the premises and another descending from the roof of the
building. After the officer gave warning, he shot one of the defendants in the leg. Following the arrest an officer who was inspecting
the area found a crowbar near the corner of the building and an
axe near the hole in the roof.
s4
The Nebraska cases in accord with Hunter are Liakas v. State
85
and State v. Stroh. When the defendant was arrested in Liakas,
the tools which could have been used to provide him access to the
store in which he was discovered, were lying loose in defendant's
trunk. In admitting the tools into evidence, the Nebraska Supreme
Court held: "[E]vidence showing that he owned, possessed, or had
access to any articles with which the crime was or might have been
committed is competent."8 6
87
People v. Fontana
is cited in Stroh with apparent approval,
but the Nebraska Supreme Court emphasized that Fontana contained "no proof that the articles found had ever been in the possession of any of the defendants, [therefore] evidence relating to
them is inadmissible."88 In Stroh the tools were found in the possession of the accomplice and were deemed admissible for the

81 183 Neb. 689, 163 N.W.2d 879 (1969).
82 State v. Stroh, 181 Neb. 24, 146 N.W.2d 756 (1966).
83 People v. Fontana, 356 Ill. 461, 190 N.E. 910 (1934); People v. Stanton,
16 Ill. 2d 459, 158 N.E.2d 47 (1959); People v. Santucci, 24 Ill. 2d 93,
180 N.E.2d 491 (1962); People v. Craddock, 30 Ill. 2d 348, 196 N.E.2d
672 (1964).
84 161 Neb. 130, 72 N.W.2d 677 (1955).
85 181 Neb. 24, 146 N.W.2d 756 (1966).
86 161 Neb. 130, 143, 72 N.W.2d 677, 684 (1955).
87 356 Ill. 461, 190 N.E. 910 (1934).
38 Id. at 467, 190 N.E. at 913.
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purpose of showing intent. The possible inconsistency with Fontana
is overcome by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Stroh by demonstrating that the evidence established a link between the defendant
and the tools.
The Illinois Supreme Court has now distinguished Fontana and
has established the following rule: "[B]urglary tools found in a
building in which the accused was caught, or from which he fled,
are competently received in evidence. " 89 The Nebraska Supreme
Court in Hunter now adopts the Illinois rule and defines "in the
building" or "in the premises" to include an area close to the burglarized building. Herein lies the essence of the court's decision in
relation to former precedent. Previous Nebraska cases have involved factual situations which limited the rule to tools found
actually in the possession of the defendant" ° or his accomplice'1
The rule in Nebraska is now extended to include tools found around,
as well as in, the burglarized building. This modification, though
logically extending the old doctrine, presents some problems for
the jury in attempting to link the tools to the defendant. The admission of the tools into evidence does not establish the defendant's
guilt but this evidence "that defendant had the means to commit
the offense in the manner that it was committed ... is a circumstance which the jury may consider." 92 Evidence submitted to the
jury in the past has been limited to tools found in the actual possession of the defendant; the jury is now allowed to consider as evidence, tools that were located around the building area from which
the defendant was seen fleeing. This expansion gives the prosecutor
more latitude in what he may present for jury consideration. It
may, however, necessitate a later definition by the court of the
nexus required to be shown between the defendant and the tools.
D. PROCEDURE
State v. Brockman93 dealt with an alleged failure to give the
required allocution9 4 by a District Judge. The Nebraska Supreme
Court held that former precedent in Nebraska indicating that every
error in allocution is prejudicial would be henceforth disapproved. 95
This proceeding stems from the criminal prosecution of H. N.
Brockman for possession of marijuana. The defendant waived pre89 People v. Santucci, 24 Ill. 2d 93, 100, 180 N.E.2d 491, 494 (1962).
Liakas v. State, 161 Neb. 130, 72 N.W.2d 677 (1955).

90

91 State v. Stroh, 181 Neb. 24, 146 N.W.2d 756 (1966).

Phillips v. State, 157 Neb. 419, 422, 59 N.W.2d 598, 600 (1953).
184 Neb. 435, 168 N.W.2d 367 (1969).
NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2201 (Reissue 1964).
95 184 Neb. 435, 436, 168 N.W.2d 367, 368 (1969).
92
93
94
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liminary hearing and entered a plea of guilty. The minimum sentence was imposed following the court's questions: "Do you have
anything to say Mr. Brockman, prior to sentence? Is there any statement you wish to make at this time?" 96 On appeal defendant alleged
that these questions were not sufficient to conform to the requirement of Nebraska's statute.9 7 The Nebraska Supreme Court held
that the error was harmless.9 8
The State raised the question of whether, under the Nebraska
statute regarding the "verdict of the jury," there is a requirement
that any allocution be given. The Supreme Court of Nebraska does
not deal with the question and could, by their silence, be in conformity with holdings from other jurisdictions that a plea of guilty
does not waive allocution."9
Former precedent in Nebraska, McCormick v. State'00 and Evers
v. State, 101 indicated that every error in allocution was prejudicial.
In McCormick, the defendant had been convicted of felonious homicide and "was not informed by the court of the verdict of the jury,
and asked if he had anything to say why the sentence of the court
should not be passed upon him, as is provided by... the Criminal
Code.' 1 0 2 In reversing the conviction the Nebraska Supreme Court
held that: "These provisions have been construed, as the language
thereby implies, as mandatory."'1 3 The court also held that "the
statute remains to be followed according to its provisions,
the
10 4
mandatory character of which is not to be questioned.'
The statute now in effect in Nebraska is based upon the common
law notion that in capital cases the defendant should have the
opportunity before judgment is passed to say why the sentence
of death should not be pronounced upon him. 0 5 This basis has been
largely eroded and its major justification today is therapeutic effect.
96

97

98

at 435, 168 N.W.2d at 367.
"Before the sentence is pronounced, the defendant must be informed
by the court of the verdict of the jury, and asked whether he has
anything to say why judgement should not be passed against him."
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2201 (Reissue 1964).
184 Neb. 435, 168 N.W.2d 367 (1969).
Id.

99 Bryant v. State, 42 Ala. App. 219, 159 So. 2d 627 (1964); People v.

O'Neill, 7 App. Div. 2d 997, 184 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1959); In re Clark, 24

Wash. 2d 105, 163 P.2d 577 (1945).
66 Neb. 337, 92 N.W. 606 (1902).
101 84 Neb. 708, 121 N.W. 1005 (1909).
102 66 Neb. 337, 346, 92 N.W. 606, 609 (1902).

100

Id. at 346, 92 N.W. at 609.
Id. at 347, 92 N.W. at 609.
105 Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442 (1892).
103
104
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In abandoning the mandatory nature of the statute the Nebraska Supreme Court created a test of reasonableness in deciding
whether any error in allocution is harmful. With respect to the
questionable need or value of the allocution this direction is commendable, but there could be a more serious problem created by
the decision rendered in Brockman, that is, the gradual dissolution
of any allocution by the Nebraska Supreme Court's later, definition
of "harmful." The request has been made for the legislature to alter
or abolish the present statute and such a move by the legislature
could remove the problem Brockman creates. In any case, the old
requirement of allocution will gradually be dissolved except in
those unnamed situations where failure to give an allocution is
determined to be harmful.

E. Cma fmnA FLIGHT
State v. Lincoln106 is a case of first impression in Nebraska dealing with the definition of flight and distinguishing it from mere
departure.
Defendant in Lincoln was first observed five minutes before the
burglary, parked without lights, two and one-half blocks from the
burglarized store. A few seconds after the burglary, defendant was
again observed without lights. On this occasion he was one block
from the store and traveling thirty miles per hour. Defendant was
finally observed five blocks from the store with his lights on and
was stopped almost immediately after the arresting officer turned
on his spot light. The defendant's primary contention was that there
was no evidence as to speed of chase and no evidence of flight. The
Nebraska Supreme Court in holding that here there was evidence
of flight, set forth the following test:
[Flor departure to take on the legal significance of flight, there
must be circumstances present and unexplained which, in conjunction with the leaving, reasonably justify an inference that it was
effort to avoid
done with a consciousness of guilt and pursuant to0 an
apprehension or prosecution based on that guilt. 7
The test requires, first, departure or leaving which presumably
is anything taking the accused away from the scene. The real key
to the stated test lies in the present and unexplained circumstances
which "reasonably" justify the "inference that it was done with a
consciousness of guilt pursuant to an effort to avoid apprehension
of prosecution based on that guilt."'0 8
106

183 Neb. 770, 164 N.W.2d 470 (1969).
at 772, 164 N.W.2d at 472.

107 Id.
108 Id.
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Nebraska adopts this test from the recent New Jersey case of
State v. Sullivan.10 9 In addition to requiring more than mere departure, the New Jersey court held that "there may be facts, entirely
legitimate, connected with a departure which would not support
such an inference [of guilt] at all."110
With the test now established there remains the problem of
defining, through further decision, what factual settings "reasonably" fall under the test. Stating the test as they have, the Nebraska
Supreme Court has established only broad guidelines for trial
judges to follow. Before reversing lower court decisions in the
future, the Nebraska Supreme Court must be shown an abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial judge unless there is some overreaching of the basic guidelines established in Lincoln. The question
remains whether this test actually does anything to or for Nebraska
law. The court now establishes the test, based on common law,"'
which incorporates essentially the definition of flight-departure
coupled with guilt. The decision in Lincoln serves only to establish
in Nebraska law a precedent for determining what should constitute
flight and leaves the test similar to the former test of reasonableness.
IV. EVIDENCE
In Anderson v. State Department of Roads 1 2 the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that in eminent domain proceedings hearsay
evidence as to sales of comparable land may be given by an expert
on matters of land value. The court stated that such evidence is
admissible even though the expert has no personal knowledge of
the comparable sales. In so doing, the court joined a growing list
of jurisdictions admitting such testimony in condemnation pro113
ceedings.
Anderson involved an eminent domain proceeding brought by
the Nebraska State Department of Roads for the acquisition of part
of Anderson's land to be used in constructing a portion of the Interstate Highway through Keith County. The State tried to introduce
testimony of an expert witness to show comparable sales of land
in the area. The trial court sustained an objection to the expert's
testimony on the grounds that he had no personal knowledge of
109 43 N.J. 209, 203 A.2d 177 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 990 (1966).

110 Id. at 238, 203 A.2d at 192.
1"1 2 J. WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 276 (3d ed. 1940); 1 F. WHARTON, WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 205 (12th ed. 1955).
112 184 Neb. 467, 168 N.W.2d 522 (1969).
113

See Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 1064 (1967).
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the sales and therefore it was hearsay.
Evidence of such compar4
able sales was barred completely."
The courts which have decided the question of admitting hearsay
evidence in eminent domain proceedings have generally reasoned
one of three ways. First, certain federal courts and some state
supreme courts have allowed the use of such evidence, taking the
view that it can be admitted where it is restricted to showing the
basis of the expert's opinion." 5 The expert is allowed to give information as to comparable sales of property which he used as a basis
for his opinion. These comparable sales would otherwise be subject
to objection as hearsay since the expert did not personally participate in the sales. The line of reasoning is to be distinguished from
other decisions holding that an expert's hearsay testimony may be
considered as substantive value evidence." 6

In connection with admitting such hearsay evidence, see the Uniform
Composite Reports as Evidence Act, NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-12,115 (Reissue 1964): "A written report or finding of facts prepared by an
expert not being a party to the cause, nor an employee of a party,
except for the purpose of making such report or finding, nor financially
interested in the result of the controversy, and containing the conclusions resulting wholly or partly from written information furnished
by the cooperation of several persons acting for a common purpose,
shall, insofar as the same may be relevant, be admissible when
testified to by the person, or one of the persons, making such report
or finding without calling as witnesses the persons furnishing the
information, and without producing the books or other writings on
which the report or finding is based, if, in the opinion of the court,
no substantial injustice will be done the opposite party." For an
application of section 25-12,115 see Houghton v. Houghton, 179 Neb.
275, 137 N.W.2d 861 (1965).
115 United States v. Sowards, 339 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1964); United States
v. Featherstone, 325 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1963); City of Buffalo v. William
Dechert & Son, Inc., 57 Misc. 2d 870, 293 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1968); Harris
County Flood Control Dist. v. Hambrick, 433 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968); Baker Brothers Nursery v. State, 357 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 366 S.W.2d 212 (1963); City of
Houston v. Collins, 310 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); City of
Houston v. Huber, 311 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Wichita Falls
R. & F. W. Ry. Co. v. Cooper, 235 S.W. 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); State
v. Wineberg, 74 Wash. 2d 372, 444 P.2d 787 (1968).
110 People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Alexander, 212 Cal. App. 2d
84, 27 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1963); Jones v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 666
(Ky. App. Ct. 1968); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 337 S.W.2d 880 (Ky.
App. Ct. 1960); Recreation and Park Comm'n v. Perkins, 231 La. 869,
93 So. 2d 198 (1957); Baltimore City v. Hurlock, 113 Md. 674, 78 A. 558
(1910); New Jersey Highway Authority v. Rue, 41 N.J. Super. 385,
125 A.2d 305 (1956) (by statute); State Highway Comm'n v. Parker,
225 Ore. 143, 357 P.2d 548 (1960).
114
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Secondly, several federal courts have held that the admission of
such hearsay testimony should be left to the discretion of the trial
court. These cases recognize that certain exceptional situations will
arise where the trial court would consider it helpful to permit a
witness to give the basis of his opinion, even if resting upon hear7
say."

Lastly, a limited number of state supreme courts have taken the
position that such hearsay testimony should never be admitted.
These courts would not allow the evidence even though it is offered
for the restricted purpose of showing the basis of an expert's opinion of value as opposed to offering it as substantive evidence." 8
In a condemnation proceeding the principal means of demonstrating the value of the condemned property is by expert opinion
evidence. 19 In order to adequately give an opinion the expert
must obtain all possible information which will assist him in arriving at that opinion. As a result, the expert bases a large part of
his testimony on what he has learned through his inquiries and
investigations. The information uncovered by the expert and upon
which he bases his opinion is hearsay evidence because the records
and documents read by the expert are not produced, nor are the
persons who participated in the similar sales called as witnesses.
In Nebraska the hearsay rule is usually defined as forbidding:
the use of an assertion, made out of court, as testimony to
establish the truth of the fact asserted, unless the circumstances
117 United States v. 18.46 Acres of Land, 312 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1963);
District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency v. 61 Parcels of
Land in Squares, 98 App. D.C. 367, 235 F.2d 864 (1956); International
Paper Co. v. United States, 227 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1955); United States
v. Katz, 213 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 857 (1954);
United States v. 5139.5 Acres of Land, 200 F.2d 659 (4th Cir. 1952).

118 City and County of Denver v. Quick, 10 Colo. 111, 113 P.2d 999 (1941);
State Highway Dep't v. Wilkes, 106 Ga. App. 634, 127 S.E.2d 715
(1962); Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike
Authority, 335 Mass. 189, 138 N.E.2d 769 (1956); State ex rel. State
Highway Comm'n v. Dockery, 300 S.W.2d 444 (Mo. 1957); Dow v. State,
107 N.H. 512, 226 A.2d 92 (1967); In re Appropriation of Property of
Cooley Ellis by Ohio Turnpike Commission, 70 Ohio L. Abs. 417, 124
N.E.2d 424, rev'd on other grounds, 164 Ohio St. 377, 131 N.E.2d 397, 58
Ohio Op. 179, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 806 (1955); Aspegren v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 125 A. 213 (R.I. 1924).
119 A witness who wishes to qualify as an expert must expressly show his
qualifications to the court. McNaught v. New York Life Ins. Co., 143
Neb. 213, 12 N.W.2d 108 (1943). See 2 J. WIGmORE, EvIDENCE § 560
(3d ed. 1940). The State's witness in Anderson qualified as an expert
in that he had been a professional appraiser for 21 years and had
taught rural appraising for the American Society of Rural Appraisers
and Farm Managers.
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under which the statement was made are such as to justify the
waiver of the requirement
that it be given under oath and subject
0
to cross-examination.12
Hearsay evidence is most generally objected to because it is
not trustworthy nor is it subject to the test of cross-examination.
Theory of the Hearsay Rule. The fundamental test, shown by
experience to be invaluable, is the test of Cross-examination. The
rule, to be sure, calls for two elements, Cross-examination proper,
and Confrontation; but the former is the essential and indispensable
feature, the latter is only subordinate and dispensable....
1. The theory of the Hearsay rule is that the many possible
deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and untrustworthiness,
which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may
be best brought to light and exposed by the test of Cross-examination. . . . [T]he Hearsay rule, as accepted in our law, signifies
a rule rejecting assertions, offered testimonially, which have not
been in some way subjected to the test of Cross-examination... 121
These two general criticisms of hearsay evidence, lack of trustworthiness and the opportunity to cross-examine, are less valid
when applied to an expert's opinion in condemnation proceedings.
In order to qualify as an expert in the proceedings the witness must
meet certain standards. As noted earlier, 122 it must be shown to the
satisfaction of the court that the witness has had experience in
appraising or dealing in real estate as a business. These standards
in most instances should be sufficient to dispel the argument of
trustworthiness.
Ordinarily evidence ... given by an expert as the basis of his
opinion as to value comes with a sufficient guarantee of trustworthiness to justify the relaxation of the hearsay and best evidence
rules. 23
In addition, the expert should be allowed to tell the jury the basis
for his opinion.
Testimony as to value would be worth little or nothing, if witnesses were not allowed to explain to the jury their qualifications
as experts and the reasoning by which they have arrived at the
expert opinion to which they testify; and the rule is that they may
24
thus give the grounds of their opinions.
120 Hamilton v. Huebner, 146 Neb. 320, 329, 19 N.W.2d 552, 557 (1945).
Both oral and written assertions are covered under the rule. There
are many exceptions to the hearsay rule which under certain circumstances allow the hearsay statements to be submitted to the triers of
fact.
121 5 J. WIGmOm, EviDENCE § 1362 (3d ed. 1940).
122 See note 119 supra.
123 United States v. 5139.5 Acres of Land, 200 F.2d 659, 662 (4th Cir. 1952).
124 United States v. 25.406 Acres of Land, 172 F.2d 990, 993 (4th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 931 (1949). See also 2 J. WIGMOrE, EVIDENCE
§ 562 (3d ed. 1940).
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In considering the criticism that there is no cross-examination
of such hearsay evidence, it should be remembered that the expert
and the basis for his opinion are subject to cross-examination.
If the expert has made careful inquiry into the facts, he should
be allowed to give them as the basis of the opinion he has expressed. If he had not made careful inquiry, this will be developed
on cross 25
examination and will weaken or destroy the value of the
opinion.1
One additional fear which the courts have expressed in allowing
such hearsay evidence to be admitted is that this would lead the
court into many irrelevant collateral issues which would only obscure the, main issue and thus prolong the trial. It is submitted
that any danger of collateral issues arising can best be met by
allowing the trial court discretion in this regard.
Cases can readily be imagined where the court in its discretion
should exclude evidence of this sort because of the remoteness in
time of the sales or because the property sold was not similar
to that being valued, but should ordinarily
not be excluded under
126
the hearsay or best evidence rules.
The opinions of an expert realty appraiser are necessarily based
on factors which cannot be proved as substantive facts.
It is quite often true that the most thorough, comprehensive
and accurate professional appraisals are based almost entirely
on "hearsay" in the legal sense of the word. Persons who appraise
or deal in real estate professionally make it their business to keep
abreast of current transactions

....

It is of importance to the court

and jury to know how it was made and on what information it
was based. If some or all of that information was acquired by
hearsay, but through the customary channels of the trade, or by
methods recognized as standard in the making of appraisals,
we see
no useful purpose in a rule of absolute exclusion.127
125

United States v. 5139.5 Acres of Land, 200 F.2d 659, 662 (4th Cir. 1952).

126
127

Id.
Stewart v. Commonwealth, 337 S.W.2d 880, 885 (Ky. App. Ct. 1960).
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED
RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND

MAGISTRATES,

46 F.R.D. 161 (1969), Rule 7-03: "The facts or data in

the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not
be admissible in evidence." Advisory Committee's Note on Rule 7-03:
"Facts or data upon which expert opinions are based may, under the
rule, be derived from three possible sources. The first is the firsthand observation of the witness, with opinions based thereon tradiditionally allowed .... The second source, presentation at the trial,
also reflects existing practice .... The third source contemplated by
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If each person who actually participated in the comparable sales
was required to personally testify as to the facts of his sale, condemonation cases would be severely burdened. Under such circumstances it would be almost impossible for the parties to prove the
valuation of the land within a reasonable time and at a reasonable
cost.
The witness within reasonable bounds should have been allowed to
give the jury the facts upon which his opinion as to value was
based; and it would unduly hamper the production of such testimony and needlessly prolong the trial to require that the sales
be proved with the particularity that would
be necessary in suits
to enforce the contracts relating thereto. 128
The Anderson court cites several decisions from other jurisdictions which presumably show the conditions under which the hearsay evidence will be admitted in Nebraska. The quoted portions
used by the Nebraska court state the basic qualifications:
If the expert has made careful inquiry into the facts, he should
be allowed to give them as the basis of the opinion he has expressed.... [129] If some or all of that information [given by the
expert] was acquired by hearsay, but through the customary
channels of the trade, or by methods recognized as standard in
the making of appraisals, we see no useful purpose in a rule of
absolute exclusion. Therefore, confining the effect of this opinion
to witnesses whose qualifications include experience in appraising
or dealing in real estate as a business, we hold that testimony as
to prices paid in comparable sales is not inadmissible merely because it is secondary or hearsay evidence. 130
Even though the basic conditions are given by the court, it failed
to state how such hearsay testimony may be used. For example,
may it be used as substantive evidence or is it to be confined to
showing the basis of the expert's opinion? Although the court may
have felt that settling this question was not necessary for a proper
determination of the present suit, other courts have emphasized
the fact that such testimony was only to be used to establish the
basis of the expert's opinion. In addition, the cases cited by the
court do not help clarify its position on this point. The court cites
three cases from three jurisdictions which actually stand for three
different positions on the problem. The first case cited and relied
the rule consists of presentation of data to the expert outside of court
and other than by his own perception. In this respect the rule is
designed to broaden the basis for expert opinions beyond that current
in many jurisdictions and to bring the judicial practice into line with
the practice of the experts themselves when not in court."
128 United States v. 5139.5 Acres of Land, 200 F.2d 659, 662 (4th Cir. 1952).
129 184 Neb. at 470, 168 N.W.2d at 525, quoting, International Paper Co.
v. United States, 227 F.2d 201, 209 (5th Cir. 1955).
130 184 Neb. at 470, 168 N.W.2d at 525, quoting, State Highway Comm'n v.
Parker, 225 Ore. 143, 164, 357 P.2d 548, 557 (1960).
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upon by the court, InternationalPaper Co. v. United States'31 admitted the hearsay evidence to establish a basis for the expert's
opinion. It was emphasized there, however, that the admission of
such evidence really lies within the discretion of the trial court.
In Anderson the Nebraska court did not even discuss the role of
the trial judge in admitting such evidence. 1 32 The Nebraska Supreme Court then cited a Texas case, State v. Oakley, 33 which held
that such hearsay evidence was admissible only for the limited purpose of showing the basis upon which the expert witness arrived
at his opinion. Under the Oakley rationale the trial court's discretion is quite limited. The third case cited by the Nebraska Supreme
Court in Anderson is State Highway Commission v. Parker,3 4 in
which the court allowed the most liberal extension of the exception in that the hearsay testimony is admitted as substantive value
evidence.
The Nebraska Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court's
decision, relies on all three of these cases, each standing for a different solution of the problem. On remand the trial court would not
be able to determine from the Anderson decision just how far the
court intended the exception to apply. Did the Nebraska Supreme
Court mean to give the trial judge a wide discretion in determining
when to admit such testimony? Can the evidence be used for general purposes or is it to be confined to showing the basis for the
expert's opinion? It is submitted that these were questions which
the court should have decided in Anderson. In neglecting to clarify
its position the court has failed to provide adequate guidelines for
trial courts admitting such hearsay evidence in future litigation.
V. INSURANCE-AUTOMOBILE
The Nebraska Supreme Court, in Arndt v. Davis,135 committed
itself to the "liberal" or "initial permission" doctrine in interpreting
an ordinary omnibus clause from an automobile insurance policy.
The court held that if permission to use the automobile is initially
given by the insured to another party, the party using the automobile becomes an insured under the terms of an ordinary omnibus
clause contained in the insured's policy and remains such until the
permission is terminated.
The action involved a garnishment proceeding. On September 5,
1962, Sharon Arndt, plaintiff's decedent, died as a result of an auto'3'
132

227 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1955).

For a recent discussion of the trial court's discretion in condemnation
proceedings and the use of comparable sales, see Liebers v. State
Dep't of Roads, 183 Neb. 250, 159 N.W.2d 557 (1968).

33
'34
'35

163 Tex. 463, 356 S.W.2d 909 (1962).
225 Ore. 143, 357 P.2d 548 (1960).
183 Neb. 726, 163 N.W.2d 886 (1969).
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mobile accident. The accident occurred while she was riding as a
passenger in an automobile, owned by Daniel F. Kemp and leased
to Armour and Company, which was being operated by Clyde Davis,
an employee of Armour. At the time of the accident, Davis was
intoxicated, and it was five hours after his normal working hours.
The automobile that Davis was operating was supposed to be
retained at Armour headquarters during all non-business hours,
except when Davis was traveling out of town overnight. As a salesman, Davis had the alternative of selecting between two contracts
of insurance pertaining to the use of the automobile. He could
maintain full-time possession of the automobile and use it for personal as well as business purposes or he could elect to use it only
for business purposes, in which case the automobile was to be
retained at Armour's headquarters after normal business hours.
Davis selected the latter alternative. Armour and Company insured
its fleet of automobiles with the defendant Aetna Casualty and
Surety Company. The insurance policy contained a standard "omnibus clause" which provided:
The unqualified word Insured' includes ... (2) under Coverages
A and B, any person while using an owned automobile or a hired
automobile and any person or organization legally responsible
for the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is
by the named Insured or with his permission.... 16
The primary question, which the court decided in the affirmative,
was whether the defendant insurance company was liable to the
plaintiff for the payment of a $13,199 judgment 137 against Davis.
At the outset, the court stated that the Nebraska Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act, 38 which holds an insured liable when
the insured expressly or impliedly permits another to use his automobile, was not controlling in cases of this nature because: "The
statute is not always applicable and in any event, in view of the
generally accepted definition of the word 'permission' to include
implied permission, 8 9 the omnibus clause and the statute 40 are
synonymous."' 41
136 Id. at 728, 163 N.W.2d at 886.
137 The plaintiff, father of the decedent, instituted a wrongful death action
against Davis and Armour. In this action the court dismissed the
plaintiff's cause of action against defendant, Armour, on the ground
that Davis was not acting within the scope of his employment at the
time of the accident. Id.
188 NEs. REV. STAT. §§ 60-501 to -569 (Reissue 1968).
139 State Farm Automobile Ins. Co. v. Kersey, 171 Neb. 212, 106 N.W.2d
31 (1960); 7 Amw. Jun. 2d Automobile Insurance § 113 (1963).
140 NEs. REv. STAT. § 60-534 (Reissue 1968).
141 Arndt v. Davis, 183 Neb. 726, 729-30, 163 N.W.2d 886, 888 (1969).

564

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 49, NO. 3 (1970)

In dealing with the interpretation of omnibus clauses, the court
discussed three different rules. The first is commonly referred to as
the strict or conversion rule. This rule in effect holds that any
deviation from the use for which permission was granted, however
slight, will defeat liability on the insurer's part under the omnibus
clause. The rule seems to be followed by the great majority
of jurisdictions. 1 42 The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in the case of
Witthauer v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 43 adhered to the
strict or conversion rule. However, later cases modified this strict
rule until finally the Arndt decision completely abrogated the strict
rule in favor of the liberal rule. In Witthauer the defendant
insured's employee had been hired as a truck driver with the specific instructions that the truck was to be used only on company
business. The employee had used the truck to go eat lunch at a
cafe, contrary to his general orders, and while returning to work,
he struck the plaintiff with the truck, allegedly insured by the
defendant. The court held that the "actual use" of the truck at the
time of the accident was without the permission of the "Named
Insured" and, therefore, the employee was not covered by the
omnibus clause. 44 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Kersey 45 also adhered to the strict rule holding that a daughter was
not covered by the omnibus clause in her father's insurance policy
since she lacked express or implied permission to operate the
vehicle.
The second rule is the moderate or minor deviation theory.
Under this approach any deviation from the permission granted,
which constitutes more than a slight deviation, will be sufficient
to exclude the employee from coverage under the omnibus clause.
The difficulty with applying this rule is in determining whether the
deviation was slight or of a material nature.
The more recent cases decided by the Supreme Court of Nebraska lend support to the third rule, commonly referred to as the
liberal or initial permission rule. Under this rule, once permission
is given to use the vehicle it will be extended to include any and
all uses of the vehicle. Three recent cases decided by the Nebraska
Supreme Court have followed this rule.
ProtectiveFire & Casualty Co. v. Cornelius140 involved an action
whereby Protective Fire & Casualty Company, plaintiff, was seek142 See 7 Am. Jum. 2d Automobile Insurance § 123

A.L.R.2d 600, 651 (1949).
143 149 Neb. 728, 32 N.W.2d 413 (1948).
144

Id.

at 733, 32 N.W.2d at 416.

145 171 Neb. 212, 106 N.W.2d 31 (1960).
146

176 Neb. 75, 125 N.W.2d 179 (1963).

(1963);

Annot., 5
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ing determination of the extent of liability on two automobile insurance policies. The owner of a used car lot allowed one of his employees, who was interested in purchasing a car, to take a car home
over the weekend to try it out. The employee allowed his girl friend,
Glenda Cornelius, to drive the car, and while she was operating
the vehicle it was involved in a collision with another automobile.
In holding the employer's insurance carrier liable to the extent of
the policy limits for any judgments obtained against the employer,
the employee, or147Glenda, the court reasoned in reference to the
omnibus statute:
The statute is remedial in nature and has for its purpose the
protection of the public against damages resulting from accidents
arising because of the negligent use of automobiles by irresponsible
and noninsured permittees. The statute should be construed to
accomplish the purpose and policy of the legislation. We must
therefore reject the contention that the language of the omnibus
statute means that the permission to use the car in a specified
manner or for a specified purpose only bears upon the liability
where permission to use the car is in fact given. Under this rule
...a deviation from the permitted use is immaterial, the only
essential being
that permission be given for use in the first
8
instance.14
In citing the Cornelius case the court in Arndt stated that: "[L]iability was based primarily upon the provisions of the Nebraska
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. It would appear that the
same result would have been obtained had consideration been con149
fined to the omnibus clause."'
In Metcalf v. HartfordAccident Indemnity Co., 150 a president of
a corporation permitted his son to use a company owned car. At
times, the president had used the car for personal and family purposes. He instructed his son not to allow anyone else to operate
the automobile. An accident occurred while the son's friend was
driving the car. Thus the question presented was whether a permittee had the ability to grant permission to a second permittee.
The court stated that a person who assists a user of an automobile
by taking over the operation of the vehicle becomes an additional
insured within the meaning of the omnibus clause. The Metcalf
case, therefore, must also be considered to comply with the liberal
rule.

NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-534 (Reissue 1968).
Protective Fire & Casualty Co. v. Cornelius, 176 Neb. 75, 79-80, 125
N.W.2d 179, 182-83 (1963).
149 Arndt v. Davis, 183 Neb. 726, 730-31, 163 N.W.2d 886, 888-89 (1969).
150 176 Neb. 468, 126 N.W.2d 471 (1964).
147
148
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151
In Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.,
the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated that: "Protective Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Cornelius... [152 commits us to a broad rather than
a narrow construction of the word 'permission' as it is used in the
omnibus clause."'153 This recent expression by the Nebraska Supreme Court clearly evidences an adherence to the liberal rule.

The Nebraska Supreme Court in Arndt observed that the law
in Nebraska, as evidenced by the interpretations given to omnibus
clauses in the previous cases, is in an undefined status. The cases
are not in accord with each other and are based on different interpretations of omnibus clauses. However, the court concluded that
in view of the recent cases, Nebraska was committed to the liberal
doctrine.
Although the position taken by the court was contrary to the
general rule, there are some very strong policy considerations supporting the court's position. Under the facts presented in Arndt,
the court reasoned that to adhere to the strict or conversion rule,
"would verge on the impractical and the ridiculous. ' 154 Adherence
to the strict rule could require Davis to stop using his car after
normal business hours if he were out of town. It is conceivable that
Davis would have to get a taxi to his motel since he would have
to park the car adjacent to the place where he made his last business call of the day. He would be required to do the same for any
traveling he did after business hours while out of town, whether
it be going to a restaurant, a church or a social function. 155 The
court's opinion stating that such a situation would be highly restrictive and impractical does not seem at all unreasonable. In their
policy argument for the liberal rule the court stated:
Proponents of this rule justify it on the ground that it is good
public policy to protect persons injured in automobile accidents
against uninsured motorists. They further justify the rule on the
theory that the purpose of the omnibus clause is to broaden the
coverage of the policy to cover all persons operating the insured
automobile with the knowledge and consent of the insured owner
and insist that once the owner has placed the automobile in the
possession of the driver and consented to his operating the automobile, any deviation from the purposes for which the automobile
was entrusted to the operator is immaterial.156
151 180 Neb. 555, 143 N.W.2d 923 (1966).
152 176 Neb. 75, 125 N.W.2d 179 (1963).
153 Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 180 Neb. 555, 561, 143
N.W.2d 923, 927 (1966).
'54 Arndt v. Davis, 183 Neb. 726, 733, 163 N.W.2d 886, 890 (1969).
155 Id. at 732-33, 163 N.W.2d at 889-90.
156

Id. at 729, 163 N.W.2d at 888.
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Other jurisdictions have adopted the liberal rule and approach
the issue in a similar manner.15' In the case of Konrad v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co.,158 the Supreme Court of Illinois stated:
When the named insured has initially once given permission
to another person to use his motor vehicle but that person deviates
from the permission granted, Illinois follows the so-called initial
permission rule to the effect that the user need only have received
permission to take the vehicle in the first instance, and any use
while it remains in his possession is with 'permission,' under the
omnibus clause, though that use may be for a purpose not contemplated by the named insured when he parted with possession
of the vehicle ....159
The Arndt decision indicates that the Nebraska Supreme Court
has made the liberal rule of interpretation of omnibus clauses the
settled and clearly defined law of Nebraska. A practical consequence
of the decision may be that automobile liability insurance companies in Nebraska will no longer offer different types of automobile
liability insurance policies. According to Arndt, once permission is
given liability will be extended to all situations. Therefore, insurance companies may only offer a policy covering the employee
under all circumstances. Assuming a higher premium on this type
of policy than on the type that only covers the employee during
normal business hours, there will be an increase in insurance costs
for the employer. This increased cost would most likely be deferred
in this case through higher prices on Armour's products or lower
wages for Armour's employees.
VI.

NATURAL RESOURCES

160
In Baumgartnerv. Gulf Oil Corporation,
a case of first impression in this state, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that where
primary recoverable oil has been exhausted, the operator of a secondary recovery project, authorized by the Nebraska Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission, does not incur liability to owners who
refuse to join the project when the injected substance used for the
secondary recovery of oil sweeps oil from the leased land of noncomplying owners.

This case involved an action for trespass and conversion. On
June 13, 1960, the State of Nebraska issued to the plaintiff an oil
and gas lease for a term of ten years. The plaintiff held the lease for
five years and then allowed it to lapse. Gulf Oil Corporation, defendant, is the operator of the Kenmac "J" Sand Unit (hereinafter
357 See Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 600, 629 (1949).
158 11 Ill. App. 2d 503, 137 N.E.2d 855 (1956).
189 Id. at 514, 137 N.E.2d at 861.
160 184 Neb. 384, 168 N.W.2d 510 (1969).
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referred to as Kenmac) which was created when the Nebraska Oil
and Gas Conservation Commission (hereinafter referred to as Commission) approved the Kenmac Field Agreement. This agreement
provided for the secondary recovery of oil by waterflooding and
was approved by all of the working interest owners in the field,
with the exception of the plaintiff. It was further agreed to by the
owners of over eighty percent of the royalty interest.
Kenmac was formed for the purposes of increasing the ultimate
recovery of oil and the prevention of waste. Without Kenmac,
there would have been no recovery of secondary oil.
Primary oil is that oil which is produced under natural energy
force. Secondary oil is that oil which is produced by either supplementing or introducing extraneous pressure into the producing formation by the injection of water or other means, and can
be recovered only by a unit operation. To obtain secondary oil
it is necessary to unitize a field to protect the relative rights of the
parties since an operation for the secondary recovery of oil by
water-flooding necessarily causes the oil and water to migrate
across lease lines.
Testimony accepted at trial established that plaintiff could not
have profitably developed his lease; that plaintiff refused to join
Kenmac unless his assessment of the costs and profits, which was
fair and equitable, was waived; and that the development of plaintiff's lease by waterflooding by Kenmac would have resulted in a
$27,455 profit to plaintiff.
The court pointed out that the law of Nebraska pertaining
to the question of unitization had been amended since the formation
of Kenmac.161 However, the court stated that the case had to be
decided under the law as it existed prior to the amendment.
In reaching its decision the court focused its attention on the
nature of oil and gas and an examination of the objectives of the
Nebraska Oil and Gas Conservation Act,' 62 giving consideration to
the public policy arguments contained therein.
The court reasoned that it was in the best interests of the state
and its citizens if the natural resources of oil and gas within its
borders could be utilized to their fullest extent.163 The declared
161 NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-910.03 (Reissue 1968). This statute provides for
compulsory unitization upon the approval of 75% of the production
owners and those required to pay 75% of the development costs.
162 NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-901 to -921 (Reissue 1968).
163 "It is hereby declared to be in the public interest ... to authorize and

to provide for the operation and development of oil and gas properties
in such a manner that the greatest ultimate recovery of oil and gas be
had; .

.

. and to encourage and to authorize . . . secondary recovery
." NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-901 (Reissue 1968).

operations.. .
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public policy in this state, as indicated by the legislature, is to
encourage and authorize secondary recovery operations. Compliance with this policy will insure that the greatest possible economic
benefit is obtained from the vital irreplaceable natural resources of
oil and gas within the state for the common good of the general
public.M
The law of capture provides that a person may acquire title to
oil or gas which he produces' from wells on his own land even
though the oil or gas may have migrated from adjoining lands. Pursuant to this rule, a person can appropriate the oil or gas flowing
from his neighbors' lands without their consent and without incurring any liability.6 5 Confronted with the question of whether the
law of capture could be applied where an extraneous substance was
injected into oil reservoirs to induce the migration of oil, the
court in Baumgartner affirmed the rule but limited its application
by saying:
We have reached the conclusion that where the primary recoverable oil has been exhausted, all interested parties in the field must
be offered an opportunity to join in any unitization project to
recover secondary oil on a fair and equitable basis, and if any
interested party refuses to join he should not be permitted to
capitalize on that refusal. To hold otherwise would discourage
unitization and encourage rather than avoid waste. Consequently,
we hold where a secondary recovery project has been authorized
by the commission the operator is not liable for willful trespass to
owners who refused to join the project
when the injected recovery
substance moves across lease lines. 166
The court's decision is obviously restricted to a rather narrow
set of circumstances. In view of the fact that a statute has been
enacted which deals with the issues presented by Baumgartner,
the court was justified in so limiting its holding.
However, there is authority which indicates that this was a
trespass. 67 In Jenal v. Green Island DrainCo.,16 8 the Supreme Court
of Nebraska stated:
The legislature possesses no authority, however, to take the property of one citizen and transfer it to another, even when full
compensation is made. The law guarantees to every one the free
use and enjoyment of his property, and he can be required to
surrender it only when it is required for public use, and upon full
compensation being made.169
164 Id.
165 California Co. v. Britt, 247 Miss. 718, 154 So. 2d 144 (1963).
166 Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 184 Neb. 384, 394, 168 N.W.2d 510,
516 (1969).
167 See Mining Co. v. Tarbet, 98 U.S. 463 (1878); 43 C.F.R. § 9293.0 to .7;
36 Am. JuR. Mines and Minerals § 7 (1941).
168 12 Neb. 163, 10 N.W. 547 (1881).
169 Id. at 166-67, 10 N.W. at 548 (citations omitted).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 49, NO. 3 (1970)

570

Two cases which have ruled on the question presented in Baumgartnerheld that the underground migration of oil and water across
lease lines which necessarily results from the recovery of secondary
oil does not constitute a trespass. In Railroad Commission v. Manziel'70 the Supreme Court of Texas, in a case of first impression,
held that the common law doctrine of trespass does not apply to
the migration onto an offsetting lease of water from an injection
well which is authorized by the Texas Railroad Commission under
the oil and gas conservation laws of that state. In Manziel the court
stated:
The orthodox rules and principles applied by the courts as
regards surface invasions of land may not be appropriately applied
to subsurface invasions as arise out of the secondary recovery
of natural resources. If the intrusions of salt water are to be
regarded as trespassory in character, then under common notions
of surface invasions, the justifying public policy considerations
behind secondary recovery operations could not be reached in considering the validity and reasonableness of such operations. Certainly, it is relevant to consider and weigh the interests of society
and the oil and gas industry as a whole against the interests of the
individual operator who is damaged; and if the authorized activities
in an adjoining secondary recovery unit are found to be based on
occasion, then this court should sussome substantial, justifying
17
tain their validity. 1
In CaliforniaCo. v. Britt, 72 the Mississippi Supreme Court held
that the injection of gas in a unit well which swept oil from plaintiff's lease onto the unit where it was produced by a unit recovery
well did not constitute a common law trespass. In answering the
plaintiff's claim for the value of the oil drained from his lease on
the ground of willful and malicious trespass, the court held that
no trespass had occurred stating:
Since there was no invasion of appellees' mineral interest by
drilling a well on it, and all of California's activities have been
in accord with the requirements of the conservation act and orders
of the board, this is one of those cases, somewhat unusual today,
where the law of capture applies .... 173
The Britt case seems to be directly in accord with the holding of
the Nebraska Supreme Court in Baumgartner.
In the future the statutory amendment 174 will control issues of
this nature. In any event, the court has indicated through Baumgartner that the controlling questions with regard to statutory
361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
171 Id. at 568 (citations omitted).
172 California Co. v. Britt, 247 Miss. 718, 154 So. 2d 144 (1963).
173 Id. at 727, 154 So. 2d at 147.
174 NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-910.03 (Reissue 1968).
170
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construction will center around the welfare of the public and the
peculiar nature of oil and gas reservoirs in relation to the weight
of the individual rights concerned.
One criticism of the Baumgartner decision is the ambiguous
nature of the remand. The court stated that: "[T]he judgment
herein is reversed and the cause remanded to the district court for
retrial under the rule of damages enunciated above.' 75 The problem
centers around the question of what damages the court will sanction in compliance with their decision.
As the facts point out, plaintiff never had the opportunity to
capture the primary oil in his lease before the secondary operation
swept it away. The court recognized the fact that plaintiff was
entitled to this primary oil even though efforts to extract it on
his part would have resulted in an economic loss. The dissenting
opinion advocated dismissal of the suit for this reason. The question
that arises is which standard to use in computing damages; can
plaintiff recover for only primary oil less expenses or can he recover
for secondary oil also? The standard of damages for recovery of
only primary oil is advanced when the court states: "[T]he most
that plaintiff should have a right to recover is what he can prove
by a preponderance of the evidence he could have obtained through
his own efforts if he had drilled, developed, and operated his property outside the unitization project .....71 The standard of damages
for the recovery of both primary and secondary oil is suggested
when the court states: "If the testimony of his manager of operations is accepted, then the profit he could have realized from his
own operations for both primary and secondary recovery would
have been $12,224.2'17 In the first instance the court implies a recovery for only primary oil since through his own efforts he could not
have recovered any secondary oil, secondary oil only being recoverable through the joint efforts of the unit members. However, in
the second instance the court states that plaintiff can recover
something for secondary oil. This apparent contradiction makes the
rule of damages to be applied very ambiguous. It is submitted that
the proper rule of damages to be applied is the profit or loss plaintiff
would have realized through his own primary operations, since that
seems to follow the basic reasoning of the decision.
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Brummund v. Vogel7 8 was presented with a question as to the extent to which the owner of land
175

176
'77
178

184 Neb. at 400, 168 N.W.2d at 519.
Id. at 399-400, 168 N.W.2d at 519
Id. at 400, 168 N.W.2d at 519.
184 Neb. 415, 168 N.W.2d 24 (1969).
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bounding upon a watercourse 1'7 9 is entitled to interrupt the natural
flow of a stream in a manner consistent with the rights of lower
users of the stream.
Vogel was an action in equity whereby the plaintiff was seeking
to enjoin the defendant from constructing an earthen dam. The facts
disclose that plaintiff was the owner of farm property which abutted
on a creek. He used the stream to water his livestock but had no
appropriate right and neither pleaded nor proved that he or his
predecessors in title owned the land before April 4, 1895,180 which
in the language of the court "is the cut-off date for the acquisition
of riparian rights .... 181 However, the defendants had acquired appropriator status on August 24, 1967, upon filing with the Department of Water Resources.8 2 The certificate which the defendants
received from the Department of Water Resources stated that they
could not interfere with the prior rights of any persons who, by
compliance with the laws of Nebraska, had acquired a right to use
the waters of the stream. Pursuant to this permit, the defendants
were preparing to build an earthen dam on a spring-fed creek
located on their land. The plans for the dam indicated that a one
and one-half inch pipe was to run into the interior where it would
join with a twenty-four inch pipe to carry water through the
dam to supply water for livestock watering on plaintiff's land below.
The lower court denied the requested ipjunction and dismissed
the plaintiff's complaint. In the Nebraska Supreme Court the matter
was tried de novo with the court ultimately affirming the judgment
denying the injunction, but expressly limiting the rule of res
judicata so that it should not affect plaintiff's right to the flow
through the one and one-half inch pipe. In its opinion, the court
stated:
We hold that the right of plaintiff to use water from this stream for
domestic purposes is superior to the defendants' right to construct
a dam to have a reservoir for either agricultural or recreational
purposes, and the fact that defendants may also use it for domestic
purposes will not justify any unreasonable diminution of water
resulting in harm to plaintiff. 8 3
179

Watercourse is defined as: "Any depression or draw two feet below
the surrounding lands and having a continuous outlet to a stream of

water, or river or brook shall be deemed a watercourse." NEB. REV.
STAT. § 31-202 (Reissue 1968).
180 See Neb. Laws c. 69, §§ 42, 43, 65 (1895).
181 Brummund v. Vogel, 184 Neb. 415, 420, 168 N.W.2d 24, 27 (1969);
accord, Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738 (1966).
182 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-205, -208, -209 (Reissue 1968).
1s3 Brummund v. Vogel, 184 Neb. 415, 421, 168 N.W.2d 24, 28 (1969).
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After deciding that plaintiff failed to meet the required burden of
proof concerning the effect of the proposed dam on the flow of the
water downstream, the court concluded:
Plaintiff complains that the defendants have the right to control
the shut-off valve on the 1 -inch pipe which was placed in the
proposed dam 6 feet above the bed of the stream. The evidence
of the defendants is, to the effect that this 1 -inch pipe was specially designed for the benefit of the plaintiff. Plaintiff is entitled
to protection from any interference by the defendants as to the
uninterrupted flow of water through this pipe which is provided
for in the plans of the proposed dam, as well as any silting or
other obstruction in the functional operations for the conducting of
water through the various outlets of the dam.
We hold that plaintiff's complaint in regard to the fact that the
1%-inch pipe has a shut-off valve under the control of the defendants and the right to have an uninterrupted. flow of water
through this pipe was not an issue litigated between the parties
so as to give
rise to the defense of res judicata in any subsequent
litigation. 8 4
At the outset the Vogel opinion appears to impose two separate
burdens of proof on plaintiff in future litigation. First, he must prove
the effect of defendants' dam on the downstream flow. Second, he
must prove that his land was severed from the public domain prior
to April 4, 1895, as evidenced from the court's language recognizing
this as the cutoff date to invoke "the la* bf priority of application
giving the better right as between those using the water for the
same or different purposes, and preferring domestic uses over other
uses in cases of insufficient water."'' 8 However, 'subsequent language
in*the opinion expresses that the plaintiff had a right to use the
stream for domestic purposes which Was superior to defendants'
right to' donstriact a dam and use the water for either agricultural
or recreational purposes. The opinion further states that if defendant used the stream for domestic purposes he would not be justified
in causing any unreasonable diminution of water resulting in harm
to plaintiff.'88 The court is stating that defendants' preference is
not as high as that of plaintiff: plaintiff was a domestic (cattle)
user, whereas, defendants were only recreational and agricultural
(soil conservation) users.
The court appears to hold that a domestic user, regardless of
whether he is an officially certified appropriator, a proven riparian,
takes precedence over a non-domestic user of appropriator status.
Under the well established principles of Crawford Co. v. HathId. at 422, 168 N.W.2d at 28-29.
Id. at 420, 168 N.W.2d at 27.
186 Id. at 421, 168 N.W.2d at 28.
184
185
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away, 8 7 the plaintiff in the instant action would hold a clear priority over an appropriator if plaintiff had shown that his riparian
status preceded the Irrigation Act of 1895. Since plaintiff has not
pleaded or proved riparian status, and since plaintiff has not
achieved appropriator status, the court in Vogel appears to have
stated a new rule of law.'88 This new rule of law suggests that a
sleeping domestic user can impede the progress of a certified appropriator simply by proving domestic preference.
VII. PAROL EVIDENCE
In Property Sales, Inc. v. Irvington Ice Cream and Frozen Arts,
Inc.8 9 the Supreme Court of Nebraska returned the law of this
state "to a position consonant with [the] law of contract." 90 The
court held that a broker's contract for the sale of land which had
expired under its own terms could not, subsequent to the expiration, be extended by parol.
On March 4, 1966, Property Sales, Inc., plaintiff, entered into a
valid written brokerage contract with the defendant, Irvington Ice
Cream and Frozen Arts, Inc., for the sale of the defendant's real
estate and his ice cream business. The terms of the contract specifically stated that the contract would expire on September 1, 1966.
Six months after the brokerage contract expired, the parties entered
into an oral extension agreement. Property Sales, Inc. arranged a
meeting between the defendant and a prospective buyer and, as a
consequence of this meeting, the defendant sold its property to the
buyer. Property Sales, Inc. did not participate in the negotiations
and the defendant closed the sale personally on July 1, 1967. The
defendant refused to pay Property Sales, Inc. a commission on the
sale.
The foremost question with which the court was concerned was
whether Hetzel v. Lyon'191 should be overruled. The Hetzel case
held that a broker's contract, executed pursuant to the Statute of
192
Frauds,'
for the sale of land, which by its terms limited the time
of its existence, could be extended by parol after the contract had
been terminated. The court noted that the decision in Hetzel was
based unequivocally on the case of Rank v. Garvey'93 and reasoned
that:
187 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781 (1903).

188 For a summary of prior Nebraska law see, Comment, The Dual-System
of Water Rights in Nebraska, 48 NEB.L. REv. 488 (1969).

189 184 Neb. 17, 165 N.W.2d 78 (1969).

190 Id. at 22, 165 N.W.2d at 81.
191 87 Neb. 261, 126 N.W. 997 (1910).
192 NEB. REV. STAT. § 36-107 (Reissue 1968).

193 66 Neb. 767, 92 N.W. 1025 (1902).
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Even a cursory reading of Rank v. Garvey . . . reveals that the
broker's contract had not expired and was in full force and effect
at the time the contract was modified, by an oral agreement as to
the listing price, a term not required to be in writing under the
Statute of Frauds. These facts strike a clear distinction between
the Rank and Hetzel cases. It, therefore, appears to be beyond
argument that the Hetzel case stands entirely upon a misconception
94
of the rule in the Rank case which we consider to be sound law.1

Proceeding to a discussion of the case on the merits, the court
agreed that a contract which had expired by its own terms was
legally defunct. It reasoned: "[I]n order to extend a contract, there
must be a contract in existence to extend by parol, lest the
parol agreement fall for failure to comply with the Statute of
Frauds[1951.... -196 The court is taking the position that once a contract required to be in writing under the Statute of Frauds has
expired, it cannot be extended by parol because it is then without
continuing legal existence.
The Supreme Court of Washington in Pavey v. Collins 19 7 was
presented with a situation closely analogous to that in Property
Sales, Inc. The parties in Pavey executed two exclusive brokerage
agreements in writing for the sale of real estate, which expired by
their own terms on December 31, 1946. Washington has a Statute of
Frauds' 98 substantially like that of Nebraska. On January 12, 1947,
the owner of the property wrote the broker confirming the expiration of the written contract but advising the broker that if he got
a buyer he would still be paid a commission on the sale. The broker
subsequently found a buyer but the negotiation and the sale were
made between the buyer and the owner. The owner refused to pay
the broker a commission on the sale and the broker filed suit, contending that the original contract had been extended, both orally
and in writing. The Washington Supreme Court, in reversing the
trial court's decision allowing the extension as valid, held that:
[A] contract which by its terms has expired is legally defunct,
and, since the vitality which it once had has ceased, there is
nothing upon which an extension may legally operate.... [W]hen
the contract has terminated or been extinguished, it is no longer
subject to extension, for extension implies an existing agreement.
To bring the terms of an extinguished contract into renewed
existence requires a new contract embodying such terms.199
194

Property Sales, Inc. v. Irvington Ice Cream & Frozen Arts, Inc., 184

Neb. 17, 19, 165 N.W.2d 78, 79 (1969).
195 NEB. REv. STAT. § 36-107 (Reissue 1968).
196 Property Sales, Inc. v. Irvington Ice Cream & Frozen Arts, Inc., 184
Neb. 17, 19, 165 N.W.2d 78, 79 (1969).
197 31 Wash. 2d 864, 199 P.2d 571 (1948).
198 WASH. REV. CODE ANx. § 19.36.010 (1961).
199 Pavey v. Collins, 31 Wash. 2d 864, 870, 199 P.2d 571, 574 (1948).

576

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 49, NO. 3 (1970)

The Supreme Court of Nebraska cited the Pavey case as per2
haps the most persuasive authority in support of their position. 00
However, an obvious mistake appears in the opinion of the Nebraska
Supreme Court where they state: "[F]or several reasons, we disagree with the theory of extension of the Supreme Court of Washington." 201 The court meant to refer to the decision of the Washington trial court and not to the decision of the Supreme Court of
Washington, since it was the trial court that argued in favor of the
theory of extension. The reasons given by the Nebraska Supreme
Court for disagreeing with the Supreme Court of Washington on
the theory of extension, are the same reasons advanced by the
Washington Supreme Court for disagreeing with the Washington
trial court on the theory of extension. Once this ambiguity in the
opinion of Property Sales, Inc. is clarified, it becomes clear that the
Supreme Court of Nebraska is in complete accord with the Supreme
Court of Washington.
As a logical consequence of its decision, the Nebraska Supreme
Court overruled the decision in Hetzel v. Lyon,20 2 and returned the
law of Nebraska to a position consonant with the law of contract.2 03
2 4
In doing so, the court also reaffirmed the rule in Rank v. Garvey. 0
As the law now stands in Nebraska, a broker's contract for the sale
of land which has expired under its own terms cannot, subsequent
to the expiration, be extended by parol. It should be noted, however,
that Property Sales, Inc. does not stand for the proposition that the
essential or important terms of a contract, required to be in writing
under the Statute of Frauds, can be orally modified if the contract
20 5
is still in effect.
VIII.

REAL PROPERTY

Horst v. Housing Authority20 6 was a case of first impression in
Nebraska in which the Nebraska Supreme Court held that covenants restricting the use of land constitute an interest in the land
and, are compensable when eminent domain extinguishes the
covenants.
The Housing Authority of the County of Scottsbluff instituted
condemnation proceedings for the purpose of acquiring twenty-four
200

Property Sales, Inc. v. Irvington Ice Cream & Frozen Arts, Inc., 184

201
202

Id. at 21, 165 N.W.2d at 80.

Neb. 17, 20, 165 N.W.2d 78, 80 (1969).

203

87 Neb. 261, 126 N.W. 997 (1910).
2 A. CoRBiN, CoRsiN ON CoNTRAcTs 103 (1950).

204

66 Neb. 767, 92 N.W. 1025 (1902).

Cf. Nason v. Morrissey, 218 Miss. 601, 67 So. 2d 506 (1953).
206 184 Neb. 215, 166 N.W.2d 119 (1969).
205
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lots in a residential subdivision. Appellants did not own any of the
twenty-four lots being condemned, but they did own other lots
within the subdivision. Each lot in this subdivision was restricted
to single family residential use by a deed covenant.
Appellants, claiming to be condemnees because of an alleged
real property interest in the covenants of each parcel actually condemned, maintained that the extinguishment of the restrictive covenants in the condemnation of the twenty-four lots entitled owners
of lots other than those condemned to compensation. The Supreme
Court of Nebraska agreed, and20 7in so holding sided with a clear
majority of other jurisdictions.
A restrictive covenant confers a property right on those benefiting from the restriction and, as such, should require compensation
when property subject to the restriction is taken through the power
of eminent domain for a use violating the restriction 20 8 The court
used this reasoning to refute the contention of the Housing Authority that: "[T]he rights of the appellants arising from such restrictive covenants are negative rights not known at common law, and,
therefore, not property rights in the lots being acquired." 20 9
The Nebraska Constitution specifically provides: "The property
of no person shall be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation therefor.1210 Horst reiterated that this constitutional
language was an effective guard against allowing the government
to inflict damage to property without liability simply because it is
the government. Since interests in these restrictive covenants were
property in the constitutional sense, according to the court they had
to be compensated for if the owners were damaged by their extinguishment.
By this reasoning the Nebraska Supreme Court may have gone
beyond the majority rule it purported to adopt. Other jurisdictions
following the majority rule seem to limit its application to situations, as in Horst, where restrictive covenants pertaining to residential use are involved.211 No such limitation, however, is neces207 See Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 1137 (1965); Annot., 122 A.L.R. 1464 (1939);
Annot., 67 A.L.R. 385 (1930); Annot., 17 A.L.R. 554 (1922).
208 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY

209

§

566 (1944), provides that:

"Upon a

condemnation of land subject to the obligation of a promise respect-:
ing its use in such manner as to extinguish the interest in the land
created by the promise, compensation must be made to those entitled
to the benefit of the promise."
Horst v. Housing Authority, 184 Neb. 215, 217, 166 N.W.2d 119, 120
(1969).

210 Nim. CoNsT. art. I, § 21.
211 But see, State Highway

425 (1964).

Comm. v. McNeill, 238 Ark. 244, 381 S.W.2d
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sarily apparent on the face of Horst. The opinion implies a more
general application because of the reference to article one, section
twenty-one of the Constitution of Nebraska.
Jurisdictions adhering to the minority viewpoint are not in complete agreement as to the basis upon which compensation should be
denied. Some courts take the position advanced by the appellees in
Horst, stating that no property right is involved.212 Other courts,
however, have denied compensation on several grounds of public
policy. One seemingly incongruous result of the majority view
allows landowners to create a compensable right against the condemning authority merely by signing a piece of paper, but at the
same time denies a right to compensation to landowners in the area
not covered by the restrictive covenant. A practical consideration is
involved in situations where the restrictions extend over large areas
and involve large numbers of landowners. The administrative difficulties that could be encountered in attempting to handle such a
large number of claims could effectively restrain the governmental
use of the eminent domain power. One way to avoid many of these
problems, although perhaps not the best way, would be to adopt
the rationale that the right of eminent domain is founded upon the
basis of public necessity, and any covenant which attempts to hinder
the exercise of this right is to that extent void as against public
213
policy.
The trend of the latest decisions has been to deny the right to
compensation for the destruction of such use restrictions. 214 However, the Supreme Court of Nevada has recently ruled in accord
215
with the Supreme Court of Nebraska and the majority view.
Applying the same line of reasoning as the Nebraska Supreme
Court in Horst, the Nevada court held that when a restrictive covenant is extinguished in eminent domain proceedings, landowners
directly affected by the restrictive covenant and intended to be
216
benefited by it were entitled to compensation.
Horst committed Nebraska to the majority rule, but whether
the Nebraska Supreme Court will limit its holding only to restrictions for residential purposes or expand it to restrictions for busi212
213
214

215

216

Moses v. Hazen, 63 App. D.C. 104, 69 F.2d 842 (1934); Friesen v. Glendale, 209 Cal. 524, 288 P. 1080 (1930).
Anderson v. Lynch, 188 Ga. 154, 3 S.E.2d 85 (1939).
State Highway Comm. v. McNeill, 238 Ark. 244, 381 S.W.2d 425 (1964);
State Highway Comm. v. Kesner, 239 Ark. 270, 388 S.W.2d 905 (1965);
State ex rel. Wells v. Dunbar, 142 W. Va. 332, 95 S.E.2d 457 (1956).
Meredith v. Washoe County School Dist., 435 P.2d 750 (Nev. 1968).
Id. at 752.
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ness or industrial purposes remains to be seen. It should be noted,
however, that the decision appears to be broad enough to encompass
all restrictions.
The status of an unacknowledged improvement mortgage on a
homestead was clearly defined by the Supreme Court of Nebraska
in Miles Homes, Inc. v. Muhs.217 The court held that lack of statutory acknowledgement of an improvement mortgage on a homestead does not preclude enforcement of the mortgage.
Walter Muhs and his wife, defendants, purchased a one acre
tract of land from his parents. After paying a consideration of $1,
the defendants bought a small trailer house, put it on the acre in
question, and lived in the trailer house for about six months. Leaks
in the trailer forced the defendants to move into Walter's parents'
farmhouse, where they resided for the next two and three-fourths
years. Shortly after they moved into the parents' farmhouse, they
started construction of a basement for their dwelling house on the
land. Approximately a year after construction of the basement had
begun, the defendants issued their installment note for $9,288 payable to the plaintiff, stating: "'This note is secured by a mortgage
of even date executed by the undersigned ... and represents payment ... for materials ... used in the improvement ... of the property described in said mortgage.' ",218 The mortgage was never
validly acknowledged but was altered by the addition of a false
certificate of acknowledgement. The materials were delivered to
the defendant and were used in the construction of the house. In
view of these facts the court termed the mortgage as an acknowledged improvement mortgage.
219
In its opinion the court cited City Savings Bank v. Thompson,
which dealt with a similar problem. In Thompson the wife contracted with the plaintiff to buy some land. She bought the land
with the intention of moving the family house onto the land purchased. The agreement included as purchase money the plaintiff's
loan of $1,000 for improvements to the land. The husband refused
to sign the contract of purchase. By a vote of four to three the
court decided that the improvement loan was not part of the purchase money. In reaching its decision the court reasoned that:
[S]ince her husband did not execute or acknowledge the contract of
purchase, . . . a vendor's lien for the money advanced for the
improvements, as distinguished from purchase money, did not
attach to the homestead. This conclusion is not demanded by the
217
218
219

184 Neb. 617, 169 N.W.2d 691 (1969).
Id. at 618, 169 N.W.2d at 691.
91 Neb. 628, 136 N.W. 992 (1912).
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principles of justice governing courts of equity independently of
statute, but there does not seem to be 2any
way to avoid it without
20
doing violence to the homestead laws.

The homestead laws, to which the Thompson opinion refers,
provide that:
A homestead not exceeding in value two thousand dollars, consisting of the dwelling house.., its appurtenances, and the land
on which the same is situated . . .. shall be exempt from . . .
forced sale, except as provided in sections 40-101 to 40-217.... [221)
The homestead is subject to . . . forced sale in satisfaction of
judgments obtained (1) on debts secured by mechanics', laborers',
or vendors' liens upon the premises; and (2) on debts secured by
mortgages upon the premises executed and acknowledged by both
husband and wife, or an unmarried claimant.... [222] The homestead of a married person cannot be conveyed or encumbered
unless the instrument by which it is conveyed or encumbered is
23
executed and acknowledged by both husband and wife ....

An examination of these statutes clearly indicates that there
was no way to avoid the Thompson decision "without doing violence
224
to the homestead laws.1
The Supreme Court of Nebraska in Muhs adopted a position
which is in conflict with the Thompson case. The court's position in
Muhs is that there is a strong policy against allowing a homestead
to be acquired or improved without payment to, or a superior lien
on the part of, the creditor. Muhs states that the statutory provisions granting vendors', mechanics' and laborers' liens priority over
the homestead interest is the basis for this policy. The court stated
that this policy "limits the requirement for both spouses' acknowledgement, a requirement probably conceived to prevent coercion
of the wife. '225 The court in Muhs cited a 1925 article which stated:
Apparently, the object of the legislature in adding these two extra
requirements [execution and acknowledgement] for validity in
case of homestead instruments was to furnish a safeguard against
the coercion of a wife by her husband by requiring acts to be done
before witnesses and public officials. It may well be doubted
whether this safeguard is worth what it has cost in the insecurity
of land titles ....
As a practical matter, it may be doubted whether
there is any serious danger of coercion existing today. Whatever

220 Id. at 633, 136 N.W. at 994.
221 NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-101 (Reissuk

§ 40-103 (Reissue
Nr B. REV. STAT. § 40-104 (Reissue
City Savings Bank v. Thompson,
(1912).
Miles Homes, Inc. v. Muhs, 184
(1969).

222 NEB. REV. STAT.
223
224
225

1968).
1968) (emphasis added).
1968) (emphasis added).
91 Neb. 628, 633, 136 N.W. 992, 994
Neb. 617, 619, 169 N.W.2d 691, 692
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may have been true of her grandmother, the modern woman is
not easily coerced by a mere husband .... If a wife is in fact
coerced, the door to equitable relief is always open to her.226

Another article also presents a sound argument for the court's
decision when it states:
Closely allied to the status of purchase money obligations is that
of funds furnished to pay for improvements on the -homestead
property . . . . The Kansas courts have held that one to whom
money is furnished for improvements on the homestead may avail
himself of the exemption, whereas one to whom the materials
have been supplied for that purpose may not. The distinction seems
unsound, at least where by statute the homestead consists of land
and all the improvements thereon. One who furnishes money for
improvements has in a sense provided a part of the purchase price
of the homestead, and the exemption... should not be the means
of obtaining a free home, neither should it be
available for obtaining a more habitable one without payment.227

Thus, the court reasoned that the legislature, by its act of establishing certain liens as superior to the homestead exemption, manifested an intent to preclude a homesteader from acquiring or improving a homestead without payment. This intent on the part of
the legislature necessarily limits the requirement for joinder of
the spouses' acknowledgements, a requirement which, the court
implies, is no longer practical. The Thompson case was disapproved
to the extent that it conflicted with Muhs.
There is a divergence of opinion in other jurisdictions; but it is

generally held that a mortgage for the purpose of obtaining materials to make improvements on a homestead is not within the rule

requiring the acknowledgement of both husband and wife. 22 8 The
Kentucky Supreme Court in Thacker v. Booth 229 held that even
though the wife of the mortgagor had not joined in the mortgage,

the homestead exemption was not a valid defense against a mortgage which secured a note for the paymeht of materials furnished
for improvement of the homestead. In Keys v. Tarrant County

Building & Loan Association,230 the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas
held: "The erection of a house on said lot in pursuance of said'
arrangements did not impress it with the homestead character as
against the lien given to secure said loan. ' '
226

227
228

229

Foster, The Nebraska Homestead, 3 NEB. L. BuLL. 353, 369 (1925).
Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 -HARv. L. REV. 1289, 1305 (1950)
(emphasis added, citations omitted).
See, Annot., 45 A.L.R. 395, 424 (1926).
9 Ky. L. RPTR. 745, 6 S.W. 460 (1888).

230

286 S.W. 593 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).

231

Id. at 595.
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A relevant consideration is whether the Supreme Court of Nebraska exceeded its power in Muhs. The judicial function is to
interpret the laws while the legislative function is to enact and
amend the laws. In Nebraska, statutory law states that: "The homestead of a married person cannot be conveyed or encumbered
unless the instrument by which it is conveyed or encumbered is
executed and acknowledged by both husband and wife ....,23 2 Mr.
Chief Justice White's dissenting opinion in Muhs states that the
statute meant what it said.2 33 If the reasons for the enactment of
the statute no longer exist, it could be contended that it is up to
the legislature, and not the courts, to amend or repeal the statute.
It is significant that the Nebraska Supreme Court has interpreted
an unacknowledged improvement mortgage as being enforceable
as against the homestead exemption. The court seems to have
equated the unacknowledged improvement mortgage for materials
with a mechanics' lien and, therefore, has brought it within the scope
of the statute which expressly states a mechanics' lien to be superior to a homestead exemption. 234 In so doing, the court has recognized the current economic realities and equities involved in homesteads and their improvements.
IX.

TORTS-NEGLIGENCE

In Newkirk v. Kovanda235 plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile that struck the rear end of another car stopped at a stop
light. Plaintiff claimed she was not injured as a result of this collision and she remained in the automobile. Subsequently, the defendant came upon the scene in his car. Although the street was icy,
defendant claimed he was able to stop his automobile before coming
into contact with the car in which the plaintiff was sitting. Both
parties and the majority of the court agreed that he was able to
stop his car in time.236 Deciding to back up and go around, defendant
put his car in reverse but when he released his brakes his car slid
forward into the automobile in which plaintiff was sitting.23 7 Plaintiff claimed she suffered neck injuries as a result of this second impact and brought suit to recover damages.
232

233
234
235

236
237

NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-104 (Reissue 1968) (emphasis added).
Miles Homes, Inc. v. Muhs, 184 Neb. 617, 619-20, 169 N.W.2d 691, 692
(1969).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-103 (Reissue 1968).
184 Neb. 127, 165 N.W.2d 576 (1969).

The dissent said it was a question of fact for the jury. Id. at 134, 165
N.W.2d at 580.
The supreme court quoted the defendant as saying that he decided to
"get out of there." Id. at 129, 165 N.W.2d at 578. Defendant was the

owner of a 1966 "stick shift" Mustang. Brief for Appellee at 12.
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At the trial the plaintiff requested a jury instruction that the
defendant was negligent as a matter of law. She also requested an
instruction that if the jury should find that her injuries were the
result of separate independent acts of negligence (the first collision
combined with the second one involving the defendant), the defendant was liable for the entire extent of the injuries sustained. The
trial court denied both requests. Under the instructions given by
the court the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. On appeal
the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed and held that refusal to
grant the first requested instruction was prejudicial error. The
court upheld the lower court's refusal to give the second instruction.
In holding that the defendant was negligent as a matter of law,
the supreme court in Newkirk combined two separate automobile
negligence doctrines. The court first relied on several earlier Nebraska cases making it negligence as a matter of law to run into
a stopped vehicle under certain conditions. These cases dealt with
situations where the defendant-driver of one car ran into plaintiff's
parked or stopped automobile. In each of the cases the defendant
was not able to stop in time to avoid the collision. The supreme
court had held that this was negligence as a matter of law because
a driver is legally obligated to keep a proper lookout.23 8 The second
doctrine applied in Newkirk deals with the Nebraska cases defining
ice and snow as conditions rather than intervening causes. These
cases say that if the presence of frost, ice, snow, mist, fog or smoke
is known, or should be reasonably anticipated, they are conditions
rather than intervening or proximate causes. Such conditions do
not relieve a driver of responsibility for the result of his negligence
unless such a result would have occurred even if the motorist had
not been negligent. 239 In Newkirk the supreme court combined
these two doctrines and held the defendant negligent as a matter
of law.
238

239

The proper lookout rule relied upon by the supreme court is actually
one aspect of the range of vision rule as adopted in Nebraska. See
Doleman v. Burandt, 160 Neb. 745, 71 N.W.2d 521 (1955) (heavy snow;
defendant's auto collided with plaintiff's auto standing in the highway;
defendant held negligent as a matter of law); Ritchie v. Davidson, 183
Neb. 94, 158 N.W.2d 275 (1968) (defendant failed to apply emergency
brake before colliding with plaintiff's auto stopped at a stop sign; defendant held negligent as a matter of law); Stanley v. Ebmeier, 166
Neb. 716, 90 N.W.2d 290 (1958) (defendant failed to slow down in time
to avoid hitting plaintiff who had slowed to make a turn; defendant
held negligent as a matter of law). See also Schmeling, The Range of
Vision Rule in Nebraska, 49 NE. L. REV. 7 (1969).
Fairman v. Cook, 142 Neb. 893, 8 N.W.2d 315 (1943); Anderson v.
Robbins Incubator Co., 143 Neb. 40, 8 N.W.2d 446 (1943); Harding v.
Hoffman, 158 Neb. 86, 62 N.W.2d 333 (1954); Shields v. County of
Buffalo, 161 Neb. 34, 71 N.W.2d 701 (1955); Guerin v. Forburger, 161
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Unlike the cases cited by the court, the question of proper lookout was not involved in the Newkirk facts. The defendant was able
to stop his car without colliding with the automobile in which plaintiff was sitting. It was only after he had attempted to back up that
his car slid forward and hit the automobile. As pointed out by the
dissenting opinion, 240 the real issue in the case was whether a car
skidding on ice is in itself negligence as a matter of law or evidence
of negligence. The trial court submitted that issue to the jury.
By combining the proper lookout rule and the cases dealing
with ice and snow as conditions, the court has apparently created a
strict liability situation:
The undisputed evidence is that it was broad daylight, that the
automobile in which the plaintiff was sitting was in plain sight, and
that, in fact, the defendant had already stopped behind it. The
facts here are undisputed. We know of no rule that would permit a
holding that because the defendant's degree of inadvertence was
small, that it would be, therefore, nonnegligent. The only inference
that can be drawn from the evidence is that the defendant so
managed and operated his automobile as to drive into the rear end
of a vehicle ahead of him in plain sight and plainly visible to
24
him.

1

It now appears that evidence of a collision, without evidence of
negligent acts, will be sufficient to produce liability in similar
future litigation. Such a rule is not called for by any of the previous Nebraska decisions.
The plaintiff in Newkirk also requested that the trial court
give the following instruction:
If separate, independent acts of negligence combine to produce
an injury, each party involved therein is responsible for the entire
result even though the act of one alone might not have caused
the injury. If you find that the injuries to plaintiff were proximately caused by negligence of defendants as herein set forth, or
were proximately caused both by the first collision and the negligence of defendants as herein set forth and that the injury is single

240
241

Neb. 824, 74 N.W.2d 870 (1956); Bramhall v. Adcock, 162 Neb. 198, 75
N.W.2d 696 (1956); Barney v. Adcock, 162 Neb. 179, 75 N.W.2d 683
(1956); Stevens v. Shaw, 179 Neb. 34, 136 N.W.2d 169 (1965); Kuffel v.
Kuncl, 181 Neb. 770, 150 N.W.2d 908 (1967).
184 Neb. at 134, 165 N.W.2d at 580.

Id. at 130, 165 N.W.2d at 579. The appellant seems to be arguing for
such a strict liability application when she says in her brief: "[I]cy
and slippery conditions known to the driver (as they were here) are
merely conditions imposing on the driver the duty to use care commensurate with the circumstances. .

.

. If this is true, then surely

there can be no excuse or justification for the conduct of the defendant
in running into the rear of the stopped car ahead." Brief for Appellant
at 17.
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and indivisible and cannot logically be apportioned between the two
collisions, then defendants
are liable for the whole extent of the
242
injuries sustained.

The trial court refused to give this instruction. In her pleadings,
the plaintiff did not claim that she received an indivisible injury
as a result of the two accidents, nor was it alleged that she was
injured as a result of the combined or concurrent negligence of the
defendants and the driver of the car in which she was riding. The
supreme court upheld the lower court's refusal to give the requested instruction, saying that it was a well established rule in
Nebraska that only issues pleaded and supported by the evidence
are to be submitted to the jury.243 Th6 court did not stop there,
however. After pointing out that the plaintiff was not entitled to
the instruction because of her pleadings, the court went on to discuss some questionable theories of indivisible injury:
In her pleadings [plaintiff] does not claim that she received an
indivisible injury as the result of the two accidents nor was it
alleged that she was injured as a result of the combined or concurrent negligence of defendant and the driver of the car in which
she was riding....
There is no contention in this case by the plain242

243

Record at 15, Newkirk v. Kovanda, 184 Neb. 127, 165 N.W.2d 576
(1969). The instruction finally given by the trial court stated: "Before
plaintiff can recover against the defendants on her petition in this
action, the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence, each and all of the following propositions:
1. That defendants were negligent in one or more of the particulars
claimed against them by the plaintiff;
2. That such negligence, if any, of the defendants was a proximate
cause of the collision;
3. That as a direct and proximate result of said negligence and resultant collision the plaintiff sustained damages; and
4. The nature, extent and amount of the damages thus sustained by
the plaintiff.
If the plaintiff has failed to establish aiiy one or more of these
propositions by a preponderance of the evidence, your verdict will be
for the defendants. On the other hand, if the plaintiff has established
by a preponderance of the evidence all of these propositions, your
verdict must be for the plaintiff for the amount of her damages as to
each her first and second causes of action." Record at 26.
See Frederick v. Kinzer, 17 Neb. 366, 22 N.W. 770 (1885); Hall v. Strode,
19 Neb. 658, 28 N.W. 312 (1886); Thom v. Dodge County, 64 Neb. 845,
90 N.W. 763 (1902); Harvey v. Harvey, 75 Neb. 557, 106 N.W. 660 (1906);
Thornton v. Davis, 113 Neb. 529, 204 N.W. 69 (1925); Holst v. Warner,
116 Neb. 208, 216 N.W. 659 (1927); Becks v. Schuster, 154 Neb. 360,
48 N.W.2d 67 (1951); Barney v. Adcock, 162 Neb. 179, 75 N.W.2d 683
(1956); Owen v. Moore, 166 Neb. 226, 88 N.W.2d 759 (1958); Hopwood
v. Voss, 174 Neb. 304, 117 N.W.2d 778(1962); Reorganized Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Universal Surety Co., 177 Neb. 60,
128 N.W.2d 361 (1964).
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tiff that the driver of the car in which she was riding at the time
of the first accident was negligent, or that any negligence on the
first driver's part continued
on and concurred with the alleged negli244
gence of the defendant.

If the plaintiff pleaded and proved an indivisible injury from the
two accidents must she still prove that the first driver was negligent, i.e., she would be unable to collect the entire injury from
the defendant if the first driver was not negligent? Such a rule
would put an almost impossible burden on the plaintiff and also be
contrary to several well-known cases. 245 There have been several
cases in Nebraska dealing with two negligent causes or a negligent
cause combined with an act of God producing a single injury. In
such a situation the court has held that even if the defendant's
negligence is not the sole cause of the injury he is liable for the
entire result. 246 The Newkirk opinion now raises the possibility that
even if the issues are properly submitted by the plaintiff, the defendant will be liable for the entire injury only if both causes are
negligent.
X. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
A. INJURY FROM EMPLOYMENT EXERTION OR STRAIN

Two Nebraska Supreme Court cases this term more clearly
define the effect of 1963 legislative amendments to the Workmen's
244
245

184 Neb. at 133, 165 N.W.2d at 580.

Lester v. Hennessey, 20 Ill. App. 2d 479, 156 N.E.2d 247 (1959); Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., 156 Minn. 338, 179 N.W. 45
(1920); Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 85 N.H. 449, 163 A. 111
(1932); Kingston v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 191 Wis. 610, 211 N.W. 913
(1927). Contra, Cook v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., 98 Wis.
624, 74 N.W. 561 (1898).

246

"If two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor's
negligence, the other not because of any misconduct on his part, and
each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the actor's
negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in bringing it
about." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (1965).
"The statement in Subsection (2) applies not only when the second
force which is operating simultaneously with the force set in motion
by the defendant's negligence is generated by the negligent conduct
of a third person, but also when it is generated by an innocent act of
a third person or when its origin is unknown." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 432, comment d at 431 (1965).
See, e.g., Davis v. Union Pacific R.R., 99 Neb. 769, 157 N.W. 964
(1916); Zielinski v. Dolan, 127 Neb. 153, 254 N.W. 695 (1934);
Rogers v. Brown, 129 Neb. 9, 260 N.W. 794 (1935); Barney v. Adcock,
162 Neb. 179, 75 N.W.2d 683 (1956); Cover v. Platte Valley Public
Power and Irr. Dist., 162 Neb. 146, 75 N.W.2d 661 (1956); Egenberger
v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 164 Neb. 704, 83 N.W.2d
523 (1957); Tober v. Hampton, 178 Neb. 858, 136 N.W.2d 194 (1965).
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Compensation Act 247 substituting unforeseen "injury" for unfore-

seen "event" in the definition of "accident" and adding statutory
language with respect to the issue of proving causation.2 48 The
amended act eliminated the previous rules requiring unusual employment exertion or a "slip, trip or fall" and codified the judicial
rules relating to the burden of factual proof.2

49

As amended, the

statute provides:
The word accident as used in this act shall, unless a different
meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean
an unexpected or unforeseen [event] injury happening suddenly
and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the
time objective symptoms of an injury. The claimant shall have a
burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that such unexpected or unforeseen injury was in fact caused by
the employment. There shall be no presumption from the mere
occurrence of such unexpected or unforeseen injury that the injury
was in fact caused by the employment.2 5o

The first case reported by the court under the amendment
was Harmon v. City of Omaha.2 51 In that case plaintiff was a
city swimming instructor who sustained a herniated intervertebral
disk while picking up clothing baskets at the bath house where
she worked. In holding for the plaintiff the court emphasized the
legislative intent in liberalizing the act:
The substitution of the word injury for event has eliminated the
necessity of proof of an event external to the body as a cause of
injury. The effect of the amendment is to liberalize the act and
bring it into
conformity with the compensation laws of many
2 52

other states.
247
248

249

STAT. § 48-151(2) (Reissue 1968).
For an in-depth analysis of the 1963 amendments to section 48-151

NEB. Ray.

see Gradwohl, Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis of Nebraska's
Revised "Accident" Requirement, 43 NEB. L. REV. 27 (1963).
The words used by the legislature closely follow the wording used by

a great number of earlier Nebraska cases. See, e.g., Pruitt v. McMaken
Transp. Co., 175 Neb. 477, 122 N.W.2d 236 (1963); Smith v. Stevens,
173 Neb. 723, 114 N.W.2d 724 (1962); Hladky v. Omaha Body & Equip.
Co., 172 Neb. 197, 109 N.W.2d 111 (1961); Wynia v. Hoesing, 167
Neb. 136, 91 N.W.2d 404 (1958); Weitz v. Johnson, 143 Neb. 452, 9
N.W.2d 788 (1943). See also Gradwohl, note 248 supra, at 46-47.
250 NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-151(2) (Reissue 1968) (brackets indicate deletions,
emphasis indicates additions).
251 183 Neb. 352, 160 N.W.2d 189 (1968).
252 Id. at 354, 160 N.W.2d at 191. This legislative intent to restore the
original interpretation of the "accident" definition is also shown by the
amendment's Judiciary Committee. Statement of the Judicial Com-

mittee on L.B. 497, 73d Neb. Leg. Sess. (May 22, 1963): "For the last
two decades the Supreme Court has given a narrow interpretation
of the type of injury which occurs from exertion on the part of the
employee while doing work demanded by his employment. At one
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In Brokaw v. Robinson, 253 plaintiff claimed compensation for a
cerebral vascular accident or stroke. He drove a truck for the
defendant hauling cattle and feed. In order to load some bulls at
a local farm he had to pull a heavy portable chute by hand. He
claimed he suffered the stroke as, a result of this labor. The court
upheld the lower court's decision awarding damages to plaintiff.
In amending section 48-151(2) the legislature intended to alter
the old substantive requirement of unusual exertion.25 In Brokaw
the court seems to have followed the legislative intent in this
regard:
The change in the workmen's compensation statute clearly removes the necessity of finding a single traumatic event as the cause
of the injury. The "by accident" requirement of the Workmen's
Compensation Act is now satisfied, either if the cause was of an
accidental character, or if the effect was unexpected or unforeseen,
and happened suddenly and violently.... The statutory change
has removed Nebraska from the minority of states which require
a showing that the employment exertion which produced the result
was in some way unusual in order to establish its accidental
255

character.

The factual burden of proof that the injury arose out of the
employment expressly rests on the claimant under the 1963 amendment. The wording used in the amendment codified prior case law
on this point.25 6 In Brokaw the court held that under the circumstances the claimant had sufficiently met the burden of proof:
In a workmen's compensation case such as this, the plaintiff now
has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence
that exertion in his employment, in reasonable probability, contributed in some material and substantial degree to cause the injury.
Obviously, the presence of a preexisting disease or condition would
enhance the degree of proof required to establish that an injury
arose out of and in the course of employment. In this case there
was no evidence that the plaintiff had any preexisting disease
or condition which was material to a cerebral vascular injury or
accident .... The evidence here preponderantly established that
the cerebral vascular injury was unexpected or unforeseen, haptime the Nebraska court favored the more liberal rule which is law in
a great majority of the other states; but in the last two decades our
Supreme Court has construed, generally, that inner bodily injuries
caused by exertion are not compensable unless the employee obtains

such in connection with a slip, trip or fall. This narrow court interpre-

253
254
255
256

tation does not do justice in many cases and is not in harmony with
the majority of opinions in other states under the workmen's compensation law."
183 Neb. 760, 164 N.W.2d 461 (1969).
See note 252 supra.
183 Neb. at 763-64, 164 N.W.2d at 464.
See note 249 supra.
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pened suddenly and violently, and produced at the time objective
symptoms of an injury. We think the evidence also established
that the plaintiffs injury, in reasonable
probability, arose out of
and in the course of his employment. 257
In Brokaw the court made an effort to look at the legislative

intent behind the 1963 amendments to the Workmen's Compensation Act and then applied that intent to the situation presented.

It is submitted that such a logical, workable approach to solving
workmen's compensation cases is not only advantageous to the
parties concerned but should be followed by the court in future
litigation.
In Beck v. State,258 plaintiff was the widow of the State Director

of Veterans' Affairs. As State Director, Beck served on a board of
inquiry exercising jurisdiction over the Nebraska Soldiers' and
Sailors' Home at Grand Island. The deceased had become emotionally upset when L.B. 128 was introduced at the 77th Session of
the Nebraska Legislature (1967). The bill authorized the Governor
to transfer part of the Grand Island home's land to Hall County for
educational purposes. Plaintiff sought to prove that this emotional
strain came about as a result of the deceased's employment and
that the strain combined with chronic coronary artery disease to
bring about his death. The Workmen's Compensation Court initially awarded death benefits to the widow, but on rehearing dismissed her claim. The district court reversed the order of dismissal.
The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the injury was not compensable and reversed the district court's decision.
In holding against the widow the supreme court said that the
strain on Beck was no greater than that of nonemployment life.
In a workmen's compensation case death caused by (1) heart
disease that was a personal risk and (2) emotional strain that was
an employment risk is not compensable in these circumstances.
The strain was no greater than that of nonemployment life. See
Brokaw v. Robinson, 183 Neb. 760, 164 N.W.2d 461.259

The court did not attempt to determine the case under the
Workmen's Compensation Act nor did the court even mention the
statute. Instead, as a basis for its opinion the court quoted a rule
presented by Professor Larson in a law review article:
[W]hen the employee contributes some personal element of riske.g.,... a personal disease which figures causally in his injurythe employment must contribute something substantial to increase
the risk. The reason is that the employment risk must offset the
257
258
259

183 Neb. at 764-65, 164 N.W.2d at 464-65.
184 Neb. 477, 168 N.W.2d 532 (1969).
184 Neb. at 479-80, 168 N.W.2d at 533.
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causal contribution of the personal risk. . . . If there is some
personal causal contribution in the form of a previously weakened
or diseased heart, a heart attack would be compensable only if the
employment contribution takes the form of an exertion greater
than that of non-employment life. Note that the comparison is not
with this employee's usual exertion in his employment, but but [sic]
in the normal non-employment
rather with the exertions present
life of this or any other person. 260

The court cited Brokaw v. Robinson26 as establishing precedent
for the decision in Beck, yet no effort was made to look at the legislative intent as was the case in Brokaw. In Brokaw the court recognized the burden of proof and made a conscientious effort to determine the legislative intent behind the statute. No such attempt
was made in Beck. Instead, the Beck court chose to disregard the
statute entirely. Brokaw is certainly not precedent for such a procedure.
Even if the Nebraska Supreme Court in Beck is saying that the
widow did not meet the burden of proof as to whether her husband's
death was a result of the employment, the decision is of doubtful
validity because the employer, the State of Nebraska, introduced
no medical evidence as to causation. 26 2 Thus the situation is different
from other workmen's compensation cases where both parties have
263
presented evidence. In Cook v. Christensen Sand & Gravel Co.,
for example, the court properly denied recovery, holding that the
plaintiff had failed to meet the burden of proof placed upon him by
the amended statute. The court pointed out that the medical testimony showed the claimant's perforated ulcer "could just as reasonably have been attributed to the ingestion of the peanut butter
sandwich as to the emotional stress [of claimant's employment]. "264
If the Beck decision means that the claimant can never recover for
a heart attack which can be factually traced to the employment,
then its is directly contrary to the clear statutory language awarding compensation to an injured employee who can sustain the
burden of factual proof.
260 Id. at 480, 168 N.W.2d at 533-34, quoting, Larson, The "Heart Cases"
in Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis and Suggested Solution,
65 MICH. L. REV. 441, 469 (1966) (emphasis by the court).
261 183 Neb. 760, 164 N.W.2d 461 (1969).
262 Beck became emotionally upset on approximately February 21, 1967,
as a result of the legislative bill. He died on March 4, 1967.
How Brokaw relates to the burden of factual proof put on the
claimant may be seen in another opinion by Justice McCown, the
author of the Brokaw opinion, Todd v. Mer-Del Enterprises, Inc.,
184 Neb. 258, 166 N.W.2d 598 (1969).
263 183 Neb. 602, 163 N.W.2d 105 (1968).

264 Id. at 608, 163 N.W.2d at 109.
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In amending the Workmen's Compensation Act the legislature

intended to alter the old substantive requirement of unusual exertion. However, the court in Beck has now apparently substituted
a different requirement of unusual exertion. The old substantive
test (which the legislature attempted to change by the 1963 amendment) was unusual versus ordinary employment. Even though the
employee's injury was caused by his employment he could not
collect damages unless the employment-cause involved unusual
exertion or strain, i.e., greater than that ordinarily incident to the
employment. 26 -5 The new test under Beck now seems to be unusual
versus private life. The employment-related activity must be unusual as compared to a person's private life. By establishing this
new test of "unusual" exertion, the court has adopted a substantive rule of law without any attempt to determine what the
Workmen's Compensation Act provides or what the legislative
intent was in enacting the 1963 amendments. Beck has now established an unusual exertion requirement which the claimant must
meet in heart attack cases. It should be noted that while the
court has written this extraordinary exertion requirement into the
Workmen's Compensation Act, it has continued to apply a more
liberal rule in firemen's pension cases, holding that heart damage or
myocardial infraction is received in the line of duty if the fireman
266
contracts the injury while in the discharge of his duty.
It is submitted that the decision in Beck does not square with
the statutory language and legislative intent of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. To establish such an exertion requirement by
quoting an outside treatise, without any attempt to work with the
workmen's compensation statute establishes an unsound precedent
for future litigation.

265

See Pruitt v. McMaken Transp. Co., 175 Neb. 477, 482, 122 N.W.2d 236,
240 (1963): "This appears to be a case where the exertion incident
to [claimant's] occupation resulted in the back difficulty. We are
committed to the rule in this jurisdiction that mere exertion which is
no greater than that ordinarily incident to the employment cannot of
itself constitute an accident." See also Green v. Benson Transfer Co.,
173 Neb. 226, 228, 113 N.W.2d 61, 62 (1962):

"Under the evidence

adduced, plaintiffs injury resulted from work incident to his employment. It falls within the rule announced in Jones v. Yankee Hill
Brick Manufacturing Co., 161 Neb. 404, 73 N.W.2d 394 [1955], which
is to the effect that mere exertion, which is not greater than that
ordinarily incident to the employment, cannot of itself constitute an
accident within the meaning of the workmen's compensation law."
266 Hooper v. City of Lincoln, 183 Neb. 591, 163 N.W.2d 117 (1968).

See

also Campbell v. City of North Platte, 178 Neb. 244, 132 N.W.2d 876
(1965).
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B. THE INCREASED-RISK TEST AND

"CONTACT-WITH-THE-PREMISES"
EXCEPTION IN "INJURY BY THE ELEMENTS" CASES

The general rule in most jurisdictions is that injuries sustained
as a result of windstorms or tornadoes are not compensable under
Workmen's Compensation provisions unless the employee at the
time of injury was subject to a greater risk from the elements by
reason of his employment than were the people of his community
generally. This is commonly called the "increased-risk" test.2 7 Nebraska has directly applied this test in two cases: Gate v. Krug Park
Amusement Co. 268 and Crow v. Americana Crop Hail Pool, Inc. 269
In Krug the deceased employee had been employed to paint the
buildings at Krug's park. He and another painter had completed
painting one of the buildings and while in the course of placing
their paint cans in that building a wind storm struck. The storm
destroyed the building and the employee was killed. The court
denied compensation to the employee's widow, stating that he had
been exposed to a hazard common to all mankind.
[Ilnjuries resulting from exposure to the elements, such as abnormal heat, cold, snow, lightning, or storms, are generally classed
as risks to which the general public is exposed, and as not coming
within the purview of workmen's compensation acts, unless the
record discloses a hazard imposed upon the employee by reason of
the employment
greater than that to which the public generally
0
is subjected. 27
In Crow, the deceased was employed as a hail insurance adjuster.
While driving his automobile in the course of his employment, it
was struck by a tornado and he was killed. Citing the Krug case,
the Nebraska Supreme Court said there was nothing in the facts
to show that the decedent was exposed to any different hazard than
that which applied to all mankind in the area where his death
occurred. As a result the court held that the injuries did not arise
out of the employment.
In many jurisdictions there has been an exception applied to
this general rule called the "contact-with-the-premises" exception.
267 See, e.g., Spees v. Stapleton, 111 Ill App. 2d 254, 250 N.E.2d 181 (1969);

Taber v. Tole, 181 Kan. 616, 313 P.2d 290 (1957); Maryland Paper
Products Co. v. Judson, 215 Md. 577, 139 A.2d 219 (1958); Ditch v.

General Motors Corp., 345 Mich. 178, 76 N.W.2d 64 (1956); Kammeyer

v. Board of Educ., 393 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. App. 1965); Hardy v. Small,
246 N.C. 581, 99 S.E.2d 862 (1957); Knox v. Batson, 217 Tenn. 620,
399 S.W.2d 765 (1966).
268 114 Neb. 432, 208 N.W. 739 (1926).
269 176 Neb. 260, 125 N.W.2d 691 (1964). Accord, Brady v. Beatrice Creamery Co., 127 Neb. 786, 257 N.W. 66 (1934).
270 114 Neb. at 437, 208 N.W. at 741.
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One exception used to soften the increased-risk rule is the holding
that if the harm, though initiated by an act of God, takes effect
through contact of claimant with any part of the premises, causal
Although
[271]
connection with the employment is shown ....
the original force, such as hurricane, lightning, or earthquake,
did not arise out of the employment under the increased-risk
test, the injury may be compensable to the extent that it results
from physical contact, produced by that force, with some part of
the working environment. In less abstract terms, while claimant
cannot recover for the effects of the direct impact of the tornado
if the tornado blows down a wall which in
on him, he can recover
272
turn falls on him.
In Ingram v. Bradley273 the Nebraska: court recognized the exception for the first time, quoting with apparent approval the exception as stated above.
In Ingram, William and Merritt Ingram worked at defendant
Bradley's outdoor theatre, selling tickets from a small wooden
six by eight foot frame building. Usually William stood outside the
booth handing tickets and money back and forth between his wife
at the ticket window and the patrons in the car. Two of the glass
windows in the building were cracked and the window on the west
was broken into four pieces. Plaintiffs had told the defendant of
this condition, but nothing had been done.
The plaintiffs were severely injured when a very strong windstorm hit the drive-in theatre and the nearby town of Neligh. The
ticket booth was blown over, as was the wooden theatre screen. No
one else in the theatre area, the city of Neligh or the surrounding
vicinity was injured during the storm.
In holding for plaintiffs the Nebraska Supreme Court said that
the facts allowed the plaintiffs to recover under the "increasedrisk"' test- as well as under the "contact-with-the-premises" exception to the general rule:
Even under'the increased risk test of the Krug case, the plaintiffs here were exposed to a greater hazard than the general public,
because the- general public was not in a 6 x 8 foot frame ticket
windows, and skids for foundations during a
booth, with -cracked
74
severe windstorm.
271
272

273
274

1 A. LARSON, Tim LAw OF VWORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 8.00 (1968).
Id. § 8.30. Accord, Maryland Cas. Co. v. Lilly, 62 Ga. App. 806, 10 S.E.2d
110 (1940); Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 291 Ill.
256, 126 N.E. 144 (1920); Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 26 N.E.2d 328
(1940); Whetro v. Awkerman, 11 Mich. App. 89, 160 N.W.2d 607 (1968);
Dunningan v. Clinton Falls Nursery Co., 155 Minn. 286, 193 N.W. 466
(1923); Industrial Comm. v. Hampton, 123 Ohio St. 500, 176 N.E.
(1931).
183 Neb. 692, 163 N.W.2d 875 (1969).
Id. at 697, 163 N.W.2d at 878.
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Rather than solely decide the case under the increased-risk test,
however, the court applied the contact-with-the-premises exception
as well, actually combining the two doctrines in reaching its
decision:
A definite exception to the doctrine which permits recovery only
when a hazard is imposed upon the employee, by reason of the

employment greater than that of the general public, has been
developed. That exception has been adopted by a large number
of courts. "Although the original force, such as hurricane, lightning,
or earthquake, did not arise out of the employment under the increased-risk test, the injury may be compensable to the extent

that it results from physical contact, produced by that force, with
some part of the working environment . . . ." It is . . . clear that
the plaintiffs' injuries were caused by direct contact with the

glass and boards of the structure in which they were required
by the direct impact of the windstorm on
to be and not
2T5 simply

their bodies.

Under the new rule laid out by the Nebraska court, if the workman is injured by physical contact with some part of the place
where he works, then apart from the question of his own misconduct, the accident is associated with his employment and nothing
further needs to be considered. If the roof or walls fall on him there
to make further inquiry as to why the accident hapis no need
2 6
pened. T
Although the court did not expressly overrule the earlier Krug
and Crow cases dealing with the increased-risk test, their validity
now seems to be in question. If the contact-with-the-premises exception had been recognized at the time of those two cases would their
outcome still have been the same? The Ingram court attempted to
distinguish the two cases by saying that there were "obvious" factual distinctions between the two earlier cases and the Ingram
facts, yet the court failed to mention any of the "obvious" distinctions. Actually, the facts in Krug were very similar to the instant
case. Although the building which fell upon the deceased in Krug
was not as deteriorated as the one in Ingram, he was killed as a
direct result of his "contact with the premises." The same may be
said of the Crow situation where the deceased was killed when the
tornado demolished the car in which he was riding, the car being
275 Id. at 696-97, 163 N.W.2d at 878, quoting, LARSON, note 271 supra.
276

One question resulting from
with-the-premises exception
cases concerning acts of God
For examples of the diverse
applied see 1 A.

§ 8.30 (1968).

LARSON,

the court's recognition of the contactis whether or not it will be limited to
as was the situation in the instant case.
areas in which the exception has been
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his employment "premises." Because of Ingram v. Bradley, the
Krug and Crow restriction on workmen's compensation may have
very limited application in future litigation.
C. EXPERT MTEDICAL TESTIMONY
In Yost v. City of Lincoln,277 plaintiff attempted to recover work-

men's compensation for the loss of an eye. Yost worked for the
city of Lincoln, Nebraska, as a maintenance repairman. He was
cutting wood with an electric saw when a "burst" of sawdust struck
him in the face, some of which entered his right eye making it
"sting." Infection developed in the eye and approximately two
months later the eye had to be removed. The Workmen's Compensation Court (both the one and three judge court) dismissed plaintiff's case and the district court affirmed. The Nebraska Supreme
Court reversed the lower court's decision, holding that the evidence
supported the finding that the infection in the claimant's eye was
not due to natural causes or natural progression of a preexisting
condition, but rather had developed out of Yost's employment.
In holding that the claimant had met his burden of proof as required by the Workmen's Compensation Act, the supreme court
noted that there was no expert medical testimony given to link
the claiment's injury to the employment. In spite of this, the court
allowed the claimant to recover, stating that in certain instances
medical testimony is not needed to prove causation.
The Yost court framed its "test" in relation to the lower court's
finding on the need for expert testimony:
[Dl]irect expert testimony is not indispensable if the issue can be
determined from the evidence presented and the common knowledge and usual experience of the trier of fact.... There is nothing
unusual about infection following the introduction of a foreign
body into an eye.... The fact that the infection developed immediately following the accident and continued until the loss of
the eye supports
an inference that the infection is traceable to
the injury.278
277
278

184 Neb. 263, 166 N.W.2d 595 (1969).

Id. at 265, 166 N.W.2d at 597-98 (emphasis added). The Court relied
on a previous Nebraska case, Clark v. Village of Hemingford, 147 Neb.

1044, 26 N.W.2d 15 (1947), as the basis for its opinion. However, the
Clark case is distinguishable from the Yost decision in two major
respects. In Clark, the cause of the claimant's injuries and their
permanency was not questioned. Also the Clark decision emphasized
that the trial court had found in favor of the claimant and therefore
the supreme court was reluctant to overturn that judgment. The Yost
court, however, reversed the lower court's determination of the facts
and held for the claimant. This raises the question of how much weight
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The general proposition given by the court that there can be
valid workmen's compensation awards without definite medical
diagnosis is upheld by many courts.2 7 9 Expert opinion is usually
held to be unnecessary where the claimant's disability is the "natural and probable" result of the injuries 280 or where "special and
peculiar circumstances" are involved:
[I]n the great majority of cases such [expert medical] testimony is
necessary because of the seeming absence of connection between
a particular accident and a claimed resulting injury. But in other
cases involving special and peculiar circumstances, medical evidence, although highly desirable, is not always essential for an
injured employee to make out a prima facie case, especially if
the testimony is adequate, undisputed and unimpeached. Thus
where . . . injury appears in a bodily member reasonably soon
should be given the compensation court's decision when expert testimony is held to be unnecessary. The test set out by the court would
give the lower court's factual determination a strong presumption of
validity, yet the court did not indicate to what extent this determination would be binding. Another question resulting from the court's
opinion is how much expert testimony is needed for claimant's proof
of causation in the face of adverse expert opinion., Some jurisdictions
have held that if the circumstances are persuasive enough, a conclusion
supported by no medical testimony may stand in spite of medical
testimony to the contrary. See, e.g., Thomas v. United States Casualty
Company, 218 Ga. 493, 128 S.E.2d 749 (1963); Forest Constructors, Inc.
v. Tadlock, 248 Miss. 460, 160 So. 2d 214 .(1964); Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n v. Smith, 374 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
279 See, e.g., McAllister v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 69 Cal.
2d 408, 445 P.2d 313, 71 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1968) (lung cancer from fireman's employment "reasonably probable"); Colorado Fuel and Iron
Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 152 Colo. 25, 380 P.2d (1963) (severe
back injury following exertion); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Waters, 87 Ga. App. 117, 73 S.E.2d 70 (1952) "(cerebral hemorrhage

following exertion),; Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Neace, 303 Ky, 519, 198
S.W.2d 223 (1946) (death following inhalation of poisonous gas);
Dolhonde v. Gullett Gin Co., 25 So. 2d 104 (La. App. 1946) (hernia
.strangulation from bump); Crowley's Case, 130 Me. 1, 153 A. 184 (1931)
(leukemia following carbon monoxide poisoning); Harrington's Case,

285 Mass. 69, 188 N.E. 499 (1933) (aggravation of hernia by strain);
Marley Constr. v. Westbrook, 234 Miss. 701, 107 So. 2d- 104 (1958)
(cause and effect of work connected back injury); Herring v. Great
Kills Moving & Storage, 7 App. Div. 2d -797, 180 "N.Y.S.2d 846
1958) (severe back strain after moving heavy appliance); Heinzl v.

Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 157 Pa. Super. 454, 43 A.2d 635 (1945)
(ruptured artery following accident); Valente v. Bourne Mills, 77 R.I.

280

274, 75 A.2d 191 (1910) (breast removal required by industrial accident); Woodson v. Kendall Mills, 213 S.C. 395, 49 S.E.2d 597 (1948)
(fever following muscle strain); Insurance Co. of North America v.
Kneten, 430 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (total disability following electrical shock).
12 W. SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 2532(c) (1960).

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
after an accident, at the very place where the force was applied
and with symptoms observable to the ordinary person, there
arises, in the absence of believed testimony to the contrary, a

natural inference that the injury, whatever
may be the medical
281
name, was the result of the employment.

The Yost court does not talk of the lack of expert testimony in
terms of "natural and probable" results or "special and peculiar
circumstances." However, the court seems to be applying the same
type of standard when talking of the "common knowledge and usual
experience of the trier of fact."
The reason for such a relaxation of the need for expert testimony
is usually said to be that lay testimony should be allowed to establish such simple matters as the existence and location of pain,282 the
sequence of events leading to the accident 283 and claimant's inability to perform his work 28 Nebraska has now clearly joined the
growing list of jurisdictions allowing recovery in certain workmen's
compensation situations without the use of expert testimony.
James S. Angus '71
Dennis W. Collins '71
G. Eric Lonnquist '71
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Valente v. Bourne Mills, 77 R.I. 274, 278-79, 75 A.2d 191, 194 (1950).

Wynn v. Vaughan, 33 So. 2d 711 (L4. App. 1948).
Truelove v. Hulette, 103 Ga. App. 641; 120 S.E.2d 342 (1961).

284 Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Melton, 304 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App.

1957).

